INTERROGATORY - Violation of Constitutional and Civil Rights PART 1
INTEROGETORY - Violation of Constitutional and Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C § 1983/5 M.R.S. §§ 4681 et seq.; and Wrongful Use of Civil Process, Abuse of Process, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
RV CODE VIOLATION GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1. Plaintiffs own a certain piece of property located at 57 Chapel Road, Lot 468, in the shoreland zone in the Town of Madawaska, which property is improved by a seasonal camp with an access driveway, running water, and subsurface waste water disposal system (hereafter the “Property”).
2. In the third week of May in 2010, Plaintiffs rented the Property to a couple for use as a camp during the summer season.
3. The tenants arrived with a recreational vehicle (RV) camper trailer in order to facilitate their stay at the camp which was discussed and allowed by Plaintiffs.
4. Tenants asked if a second RV could be allowed on the camp lot and Plaintiffs clearly refused to allow a second RV without CEO authorization, even though Plaintiffs knew that it would be legal to do so based on the Board of Selectmen statements at Board meetings and the non-action by the Board in regards to Plaintiffs written complaints concerning the Rouleau properties.
5. For many years, Plaintiffs had received several complaints by the CEO in regards to RV's on this lot because the CEO claimed that the RV caused a -change of use-. Plaintiffs disagreed with the CEO's interpretation of the word use. These complaints were initiated by his neighbor David Rouleau.
6. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, the tenants placed a second recreational vehicle on the property when the tenants occupied the property.
7. Because Plaintiffs owned and operated a campground abutting the camp being rented, Plaintiffs did not want a second trailer to be placed on the camp lot because it generated no additional income and increased operational cost at the camp. This would be analogous to renting a campsite at Plaintiffs campground and allowing a second RV trailer to be added on the same site for the same price.
8. On June 4, 2010, Defendant, Robert Ouellet, the Town of Madawaska's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), issued Plaintiffs, by registered mail, notice of an alleged violation at the property as a result of the placement of the two RV’s on the Property. The Notice of Violation failed to meet even the basic mandatory notice requirements and provisions in order to satisfy the procedural due process requirements of the SZO under, §16. (I). Enforcement. §16 (I). (2)(a) states, “[I]f the CEO shall find that any provision of this Ordinance is being violated, he or she shall notify in writing the person responsible for such violation, indicating the nature of the violation and ordering the action necessary to correct it, including discontinuation of illegal use of land buildings or structures, or work being done, removal of illegal buildings or structures, and abatement of nuisance conditions.”
9. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer regarded this June 4, 2010 registered mail - Notice of Violation - as the start of a legal court action pursuant to Title 30-A §4452 and Title 38 §435-§447, because the penalty/fines accrue from the date of Notice of Violation pursuant to Title 38 §349 Penalties. For this reason, Plaintiffs took immediate and decisive action to correct and comply with the Notice of Violation by instructing the tenants to remove the second RV trailer from the property, even though the notice of violation did not provide the mandatory information to identify and correct the alleged violation. Plaintiffs understood that having two RV's on a camp lot was not a violation.
10. The CEO failed to include many of these mandatory requirements in the notice of violation. First, he did not notify in writing the person alleged to be responsible for the alleged violation - the tenant- and willfully ignored the M.R.civ P 80K, and the SZO provisions of §16 I (2)(a) when the CEO served the owners Richard and Ann Cayer as the violators. At the June 29, 2010 Selectmen's meeting, CEO Ouellet said “[I] sent notice of the violations to the owners which was the Cayer’s.”
11. Second, the CEO willfully ignored these required provisions and did not serve the violator, the tenant, and did not provide the Plaintiffs (landowners) a copy of the alleged violation as also required pursuant to M.R.Civ.P and RULE 80K. LAND USE VIOLATIONS.
(2) Additional Service on Property Owner. When the alleged violator is not the owner of the property on which the violation is alleged to have occurred or is occurring, the person making service on the alleged violator shall serve, or cause to be served, a copy of the Land Use Citation and Complaint upon the owner of the property by any appropriate method provided in Rule 4 of these rules.
12. Third, the CEO did not properly indicate the nature of the violation.
13. Fourth, the CEO willfully omitted to order the action necessary to correct it.
14. The enforcement process in §16(I) of the town's SZO is intended to provide all citizens a uniform, consistent, and equally fair method of code enforcement clearly outlined in the SZO which must be applied consistently to all citizens without discrimination.
15. In this instant case, Richard and Ann Cayer were not provided with the same enforcement action, and fines, as other citizens are subject to pursuant to §16. I.(2)(a) of the SZO. The alleged violators were not provided with the Notice of Violation, instead the landowners Richard and Ann Cayer were served, contrary to the SZO provisions of §16. I. (2) enforcement and M.R.Civ.P. Plaintiffs view this, and other willful procedural due process acts by the CEO and the Town as discrimination, selective enforcement, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and a violation of Plaintiffs Constitutionally protected Civil Rights to equal protection of the Law, and Due Process. (Town of Orangetown, v. John Magee, et al.88 N.Y.2d 41, 665 N.E. 2D 643 N.Y.S.2d 21(1996))
16. In the June 3, 2010 notice of violation letter, the CEO wrote, “[A]ll code violations are submitted to the Madawaska Board of Selectmen to determine what action will be taken in regards to the violations. The Town will notify you of the date and time when the Board of Selectmen will be discussing this issue.”
17. At the time Plaintiffs received the June 4, 2010 “Notice of Violation”, they understood that there might be one RV/travel-trailer placed on the Property, and that it was legal to have one RV/travel-trailer on the Property.
18. Notwithstanding their understanding regarding the legality of allowing RV/travel-trailers on the property, Plaintiffs had the tenant immediately remove the relative's RV/travel-trailer from the Property on June 4, 2010.
19. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were willfully and fraudulently charged as the violators in this meritless 80K violation lawsuit based on the fact that they are the landowners. The Law Court has made clear that a landowner is only responsible for the actions of its tenants if the landowners fail to correct the violations. In Town of Boothbay et al. v. Barbara Jenness et al. 2003 Me. 50. Lin-01-554 the Law Court held “[T]he consensus from the few jurisdictions that have considered the issue is that a landlord can be held responsible for the tenant's violations if the landlord (1) has knowledge of the violation, DeLoach, 714 A.2d at 486-87; City of Webster Groves v. Erickson, 789 S,W,2d 824, 826-27 (No. Ct.App. 1990); and (2) has the power to obtain the tenant's compliance or to evict the tenant after she receives knowledge of the violation. DeLoach, 714 A.2d at 486-87; People v. Scott, 258 N.E.2d 206, 209 (N.Y). 1970).19.
20. The Law Court continued, “[A]ccordingly, we hold that a landlord can be held to have violated the ordinance and can be sanctioned for the continuing violation of an ordinance by a tenant when: (1) the ordinance authorizes separate penalties against a landlord: (2) the landlord has notice of the violation; (3) the landlord has a reasonable ability to control the use of the land: and (4) the landlord has been given a reasonable opportunity to obtain the tenant's compliance or eviction.”
21. In this instant case, although Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were not properly served by the CEO identifying the exact violation, i.e.: was the alleged violation on June 4, 2010, as claimed in Count I, that the Plaintiffs were creating another residential dwelling on their camp lot when the tenants parked their RV at the camp they had rented from Plaintiffs? Judge Daigle made clear to Attorney Currier “[R]ecreational vehicles are not residential dwelling units.” Or, were the tenants creating another campground as alleged in Count II, and served on February 5, 2013 (895) (emphasis added) days after all RV's had been removed without providing Plaintiffs any notice of violation pursuant to §16 I(2)(a)?
22. On June 21, 2010, CEO Ouellet sent Plaintiffs a letter by regular mail, “[T]his letter is to inform you that the Board of Selectmen will be addressing what action will be taken regarding the violation on 57 Chapel Road Lot 468. Your attendance is requested at the meeting (emphasis added) to be held in the Selectmen Meeting Room on Tuesday, June 29, 2010 commencing at 4:30 PM.”
23. On June 29, 2010, the Town of Madawaska subsequently conducted a regular Board of Selectmen's meeting and discussed Article 3 Code Enforcement Violation, Cayer.
24. The Madawaska Town Attorney Richard Currier possibly traveled over 100 miles to be present at this June 29, 2010 Selectmen “meeting” specifically for the Plaintiffs RV matter. This appearance by any Attorney to discuss a possible code violation was unprecedented before or since that Board meeting. Plaintiff's question if the $500.00 fine was not simply to cover the attorney's expenses for traveling to Madawaska simply to intimidate Plaintiff's into signing a consent agreement and paying this fine, to cover expenses, because he said nothing pertaining to the RV violation at that board meeting.
25. At the June 29, 2010 meeting, CEO Ouellet clearly said “[C]ampground is two or more, so I figure this cannot be a campground……So that’s what I see and today I went to take a look again at the lot, today there’s only one. The little white one is there, the other brownish one is gone.”
26. Plaintiffs neighbor, David Rouleau who was also present at the June 29, 2010 meeting spoke against Plaintiffs' RV on the lot at issue, and according to the Town minutes, said, “[t]hat he is in a similar situation with a violation and that matter was brought on by all these rules and regulations. He has the same thing and never got a permit to do it. His case has been going on for three to four years. If it is not allowed for me, then it should not be allowed for him.” Richard Cayer responded that is different because Rouleau's lot is an individual private campsite. The first important thing to note here is that Plaintiffs original complaint in 2001 against Rouleau was initiated because Rouleau had been filing complaints, inter alia, June 1996, July 1998, June 16, 2009, with the CEO for many years claiming that Richard and Ann Cayer were violating the town code by allowing RV's on Plaintiffs camp lot. David Rouleau's illegally subdivided part of his house lot and was renting 39 feet to be used as an illegal Individual Private Campsite, pursuant to, and in violation of the Madawaska and DEP SZO §15E. The second important thing to note is that the Town did take an enforcement action for the building violations, but willfully refused to prosecute the more serious mandatory DEP violations, such as, the individual private campsite, pursuant to DEP SZO §15E, or the illegal cesspool Rouleau created. Furthermore, the individual private campsite was still willfully in operation in 2012 while the Town was prosecuting the RV violation against Plaintiffs even after Rouleau told the Board, “[t]hat he is in a similar situation with a violation and that matter was brought on by all these rules and regulations. He has the same thing and never got a permit to do it.” Rouleau never received a permit for any RV's on his house or individual private campsite and never received a notice of violation.
27. After the Town discussed the alleged violation, Plaintiff Richard Cayer told the Board “[i]f that's the intent, that you are not going to allow that anymore , all I can say is, I apologize that I didn't know and I will have it removed as quickly as I can.” Plaintiff said this to the Board before anyone had ever instructed or requested Plaintiff to remove the last RV from the camp lot, including the CEO's notice of violation, as required pursuant to §16. (I) (2)(a) under Enforcement.
28. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer should have been commended for their usual level of polite cooperation at the June 29, 2010 meeting in spite of the willful malicious prosecution, and fraudulent enforcement of a meritless lawsuit, perpetrated on two (2) of its citizens, by the CEO and the Town of Madawaska.
29. It was only after Plaintiff apologized and said that he would have the one remaining RV removed the next day that the Board acting without any legal authority to do so, willfully instituted a fraudulent act when they maliciously, found a violation existed on the property, imposed a $500 fine on Plaintiffs, and rewarded the alleged violator, the tenant, by allowing the RV trailer to remain an extra 5 days beyond the date Plaintiff said they would have it removed. Audio and video recordings are available of this meeting.
30. The Board maliciously and willfully informed Plaintiffs that they would have to sign a Consent Agreement admitting to meritless code violation charges to which Plaintiffs did not commit. This fraudulent act by the Town would have incriminated Plaintiffs for meritless code violations preventing Plaintiffs from forever allowing RV's on their camp lots. This is only one citation of the many methods the Town fraudulently used the legal system to intimidate and coerce Plaintiff's Richard and Ann Cayer into submission.
31. The Town through its CEO, Town Manager, Selectmen, and Attorney R. Currier willfully violated Plaintiffs Constitutional procedural Due Process Rights by willfully ignoring the plain language provided in the Town SZO requiring all provisions of §16.I.(2)(a) to be applied before threatening Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer, with a $500 fine pursuant to §16.I.(3), for Legal Actions when a violator refuses to comply.
32. In this instant case, the willful abuse of process, pursuant to Section §16.I.(3), Legal Actions, was used fraudulently to willfully punish, coerce, intimidate, and forever bar Plaintiff's from placing RV's on their camp lots, while all others in this municipality continue to enjoy this privilege, as is allowed to this day, without permits.(emphasis added)
33. CEO Ouellet questioned if the fine should be $1,000 because there had been 2 RV's at one time.
34. After Plaintiffs cooperated with the Board and agreed without hesitation, to have the last RV removed by the tenant who placed it there, before anyone instructed Plaintiff to do so, the Town through its Attorney Currier willfully took fraudulent “[L]egal Action” pursuant to the Madawaska SZO under §16 I.(2)(3) against Plaintiffs.
35. The CEO, Selectmen, and Attorney Currier willfully ignored the provisions of §16. I. (2)(a) where an alleged violator can correct an alleged code violation, and fraudulently applied §16. I. (3) Legal Actions against the Cayer’s who were not the violators. Because of this willful fraudulent act in violation of Plaintiffs Constitutionally protected right to Due Process, Plaintiffs had to endure years of pain and suffering at great financial cost.
36. It is well established that before this June 29, 2010 meeting, fines for code violations were $200. Fines were increased for Plaintiffs that night to $500 with discussions by the CEO and Board members if Plaintiffs should pay $1000 because there were 2 trailers involved prior to June 4. However, because Plaintiffs instructed their renter to remove one as soon as it was known to them, and there was only one left at that time, the discussion by the Board of Selectmen was based solely on the one single RV trailer, and the fine remained at $500, because there was only one violation. All code violation fines remain at $200 to this day; and if the violation is corrected before a certain date, the fine is withdrawn in most cases, except for Plaintiffs.
37. In the first six months of 2018 alone, there have been, inter alia, two (2) serious shoreland zoning violations in Madawaska for work done without the necessary building permits or proper determination of the greatest practical extent (GPE) from the high-water mark (HWM). The CEO through its Planning Board held “emergency” meetings and issued after the fact permits without fines.
38. Plaintiffs were also very clear to the Board and CEO that they were not responsible for placing the trailers on the lot and were not the violators and would follow up with a letter requesting time to look into the legality of the matter, and prepare for a Hearing.
39. Plaintiffs did have the remaining RV travel trailer removed from the property on or before July 6, 2010 as instructed by the Board, even though Plaintiffs understood and believed that it was legal for them to have one (or more) RV's/travel-trailers on the property under the existing Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.
40. Based on the June 21, 2010 letter from the CEO, Plaintiffs were not prepared for an opportunity to defend themselves at the Board of Selectmen regular meeting. Plaintiffs followed up with 2 letters dated August 4, and August 18, 2010, to Attorney Currier and the Board of Selectmen requesting an opportunity to defend the meritless allegations against them, and to explain other legal facts such as “we are not the violators.” These letters, and other questions were willfully never answered by the Board of Selectmen.
41. At that time, based on these letters, CEO Ouellet and Attorney Currier clearly understood that the Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were not the violators, but simply the landowners that corrected the Town's complaint by instructing the renters to remove their recreational vehicle from the camp they had rented. Because the renters could not park their RV on their rented camp lot, they demanded and received all their money, and left.
42. At the June 29, 2010 Selectmen meeting, Plaintiff Ann Cayer asked who complained. CEO Ouellet willfully refused to divulge the name of the person who complained because it was not in writing. Attorney Currier supported and reiterated that if it is not in writing, the CEO does not have a duty to divulge who complained. However, CEO Ouellet did have a 6/1/10 note that he wrote indicating the name of the person who called. This willful violation of Plaintiffs rights to information allowed by Title 1. §408-A (Public records available for inspection and copying). Note: the person who called was Roger Collin. The Town and CEO protected Collins from being identified and did not require a written complaint as required by Plaintiffs. The Town and CEO willfully repeated Plaintiffs names in many other proven legitimate complaints, causing irreparable damage to Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's reputation. These complaints were repeated in newspapers, and in court documents.
43. Because Plaintiffs neighbor, David Rouleau, was also allowing up to 5 additional RV's, travel trailers, and tents on his house lot, and his illegally sub-divided non-conforming lot while complaining to the CEO about RV's on Plaintiffs lot, Plaintiffs pointed this out to the CEO and the Board of Selectmen at a regular meeting and in written letter form circa 2003.
44. Plaintiffs assert that David Rouleau made the statement repeated in court documents, DOCKET NO. CV-09-035 (J. Hunter) “[T]he second was that it failed to include a provision that he thought was essential. That provision would have imposed an obligation upon the Town to commence enforcement action against Mr. Cayer whom the Defendant believed was also in violation of the 1993 Code for having built an addition onto his home that was too close to the water. The parties were not able to resolve their differences and no Consent Agreement was reached.”
45. Because Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the CEO against David Rouleau's placement of RV's, travel trailers, and tents at his illegally subdivided house lot, Selectman Lloyd Tardif, at a Selectmen Board meeting, told Plaintiff, “[B]ick Cayer, you are not going to stop us from allowing RV's and campers on house and camp lots”.
46. And, at another Selectmen meeting, Selectman Bob Williams willfully defended RV's on David Rouleau's house and camp lots when he fraudulently said,” [I]t is legal as long as the RV is licensed and the landowner has given permission.” In David Rouleau's case, this was not true because there is specific language in the SZO for individual Private Campsites pursuant to §15 (E) (a mandatory State DEP statute) which Rouleau did not meet. CEO Ouellet fraudulently and willfully ignored this DEP violation well into 2012 while the Town was enforcing the meritless lawsuits against Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer brought by David Rouleau's complaints.
47. Because the CEO Freudianly claimed that permits were required to place RV's and trailers on house and camp lots, and that he had to check his records if a permit had been issued to the Cayer’s for this use. Plaintiffs knew this to be false so pursuant to the FOAA Plaintiffs requested to see the CEO's, permit book which is public information, to prove this fact. Attorney Currier willfully made this FOAA request very difficult and expensive to receive even though it was readily available.
48. Town Attorney Richard Currier denied Plaintiffs their motion for Discovery of proof that the CEO never issued permits for RV's to be placed on house and camp lots. Inter alia, Currier claimed this was a delaying tactic by Plaintiffs. It took the Town 24 months, two (2) years (emphasis added) to schedule a settlement conference with Justice Daigle, and 27 months to file count II.
49. Plaintiff Richard Cayer filed a FOAA request for information intended to prove that the CEO Ouellet never issued permits to allow RV's, trailers, or any recreational vehicle on house or camp lots.
50. Town Attorney Richard Currier fraudulently insisted that Plaintiffs pay $325.00 up front in order to review information compiled in a book instantly and readily available by the CEO. After months of delays, Plaintiff did review the CEO's permit book and there was not one permit issued for a trailer or RV unless there was construction being done on the property. This verified that the CEO was lying at the June 29, 2010 meeting about issuing permits for RV's and trailers on house and camp lots, and has also willfully committed fraud on the courts in their Briefs and Affidavit about this fact.
51. Plaintiffs received a Consent Agreement which the Plaintiffs refused to sign because, (1). there was no violation, (2). even if there was a violation, they would not have been the responsible party. Plaintiffs assert that the five (5) statements by the town in the Consent Agreement were willfully and knowingly false claims intended to fraudulently incriminate Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs believed the Consent Agreement and the letters from Attorney Currier to sign the agreement was a willful abuse of process and extortion.
52. On or about August 11, 2010, the Town of Madawaska, by and through its Code Enforcement Officer and Attorney, willfully filed a Land Use Citation and Complaint, fraudulently alleging that Plaintiffs violated Section §15(A)(5) of the Town of Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance by having more than one residential dwelling unit on the property without meeting the dimensional requirements for each additional dwelling units, and by placing the RV/travel-trailers on the property without a land-use permit.
53. On August 23, 2010, approximately (51) days after Plaintiffs removed the last RV from the lot, the town Attorney Richard Currier willfully sent Plaintiffs a letter instructing Plaintiffs to sign a Consent Agreement and pay a $500 fine immediately. Currier wrote, “[I]f you wish to sign the Consent Agreement and pay the penalty, please do so immediately and I will dismiss the pending Land Use Violation Complaint.” Currier threatened Plaintiffs with a meritless lawsuit when he said, “[I]f you wish to sign the Consent Agreement and pay the penalty,” '[I] will dismiss the pending Land Use Violation Complaint.” Because Currier was at the June 9, 2010 meeting, he knew full well there was no violation, and even if there had been one the plaintiffs would not have been the violators.
54. On August 24, 2010, Plaintiffs sent Attorney Currier a letter and copied the Chairman of the Board Don Chasse, requesting an opportunity to meet with the Board, and “[c]lairifing some important facts”, such as:
1. Plaintiffs agreed to remove (1) RV placed by tenant, and pursuant to §16.(I).(2)(a) Enforcement “[T]he CEO “shall notify in writing the person responsible for such violation,...ordering the action necessary to correct it...including removal of illegal building or structures,...”
2. (2) “[A]nd the “Legal Actions” provides for, 'When the above action does not result in the correction of the violation ....”' In this case the Plaintiffs agreed to, and corrected, the alleged code violation created by their tenant, because they were the landowners before even being instructed to as required by §16. (I). (2)(a) Enforcement.
55. Plaintiffs continued in their letter with numbers 2, 3, and 4, explaining that “[w]e never agreed to sign any Consent Agreement, never admitted to installing or partaking in any way the installation of said camper trailer, and did not agree to pay a fine.
56. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs letters of August 4, and August 18, 2010, that were never answered, Attorney R. Currier sent Plaintiffs another letter on September 9, 2010 warning that “[F]failure to sign and return the Consent Agreement and pay the $500 penalty by September 14, 2010 at 4:00 p.m. shall result in enforcement against you. No payment will be accepted on or after that date and you will be responsible for all Court imposed penalties including legal fees and costs incurred by the Town of Madawaska in these proceedings.” Because these fraudulent claims were clearly meritless, Plaintiffs assert this willful act by Currier was intended to punish Plaintiffs for their public participation in local Town Government and was acknowledged as extortion.
57. On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff sent Mr. Currier a “good faith” letter that read, “After reading your letter of 9-09-10, this is my response. Thank you, but no thanks. I will also reciprocate “in good faith” by giving the Selectmen one last chance to drop this harassment and discriminatory act against us. All that I am requesting at this point is a public apology by the Board of Selectmen and a promise to seriously review the actions by our Town Manager, Christine Therrien and CEO Bob Ouellet concerning this and previous actions against us. Otherwise, I will move forward and any future settlement will be much more difficult and demanding. You have until 4:00 p.m. Friday the 17th of September to accept this offer”.
58. This response to Currier's threatening letter was intended to let everyone involved know that Plaintiffs had no doubt that the enforcement action was meritless. Plaintiffs believed that the courts could, and would protect them if the town persisted with these fraudulent threats of extortion.
59. Plaintiffs lost, and continue to lose the income that they would have earned from the one RV/travel-trailer that could have, and should have, remained on the Property.
60. The Town did not provide any reference or citation to any provisions of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance or any past practice in support of its allegation in the Land Use Citation and Complaint that a land-use permit was required to place an RV/travel-trailer on the Property.
61. Because Plaintiffs believed that the enforcement process §16 I (2)(a) willfully violated Plaintiffs Constitutional Due Process rights, they filed a timely request to remove the matter to the Superior Court for a jury trial as allowed under M.R.Civ.P. 38 and City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶¶ 10-15, 886 A.2d 1281, 1285-869.
62. After 2 years (728 days) (emphasis added) on August 9, 2012, the Superior Court (Daigle, J.) conducted a judicial settlement conference on the matter. The Town of Madawaska CEO and town Attorney Richard Currier acknowledged Justice Daigle's reference to the SZO that the Notice of Violation and the Land Use Citation and Complaint erroneously cited Plaintiffs for violations under a section of the Town of Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance that did not apply due to the fact that the ordinance plainly defined Residential Dwelling Units, and clearly states, “[R]ecreational vehicles are not Residential Dwelling Units.”
63. With the knowledge that the alleged Count I violation was without probable cause, or reasonable grounds to support the original Count I charge, the town CEO, and Attorney Currier, requested (Judge Daigle) to allow them to amend Count I which was granted.
64. After acknowledging their clear error to Judge Daigle, on November 13, 2012 the Town of Madawaska willfully filed a fraudulent Motion to Amend its Land Use Citation and Complaint, more than 3 months (94) days, after Judge Daigle allowed the Town to amend the meritless claim, and (821) days after the town filed Count I. (emphasis added)
65. The Town once again fraudulently charged Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer with the identical and original Count I without any amendments, even after being told by Judge Daigle that Section §15(A)(5) of the Town of Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance did not apply to Recreational Vehicles.
66. The Town, through its Attorney Richard Currier, rather than amend Count I as agreed by Judge Daigle, fraudulently added another new meritless violation unrelated to the meritless Count I. This new Count II SZO violation was based on the provisions of Section §15(D)(1) related to campgrounds. The Town and Attorney Currier's fraud on the court claimed, “[T]he activity alleged to constitute the violation involved placing [several] travel trailers-camper units on a single lot.” It is well documented there was only one trailer at the time of the meeting on June 29, 2010 because Plaintiffs had the second RV removed by the person responsible for placing it there the same day Plaintiff was made aware of it by the CEO, and there was never a third RV necessary to claim “several.” Furthermore, at the June 29, 2010 Board of Selectmen Meeting it was confirmed by CEO Ouellet that there was only one trailer on the lot . CEO Ouellet said “[C]ampground is two or more, so I figure this cannot be a campground……So that’s what I see and today I went to take a look again at the lot, today there’s only one. The little white one is there, the other brownish one is gone.”
67. In their complaint to the Superior and Supreme Court, the Town's Attorneys, Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) willfully made fraud on the court statements when they claimed, “[a]fter a “Hearing” (emphasis added) in front of the Plaintiffs Board of Selectpersons.” And, “[T]he Defendants were notified of the “Public Hearing,” regarding their violations, the Defendant's appeared to contest the violation, .” First, there never was a notice of any (“Hearing”), Second, there was no “Hearing”. Third, Plaintiffs could not appeal the CEO enforcement action, and lastly, Currier wrote, “[P]laintiffs did not appear to contest the violation.” Plaintiffs appeared at the Selectboard meeting simply because they wanted to understand what the notice of violation was about.
68. In their Superior and Supreme Judicial Court filing against Plaintiffs, the Town Attorneys, Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) willfully claimed fraud on the court statements when they claimed, “[F]irst, the Defendant's never complied with the minimum lot standards enumerated by §15(A)(5) of the Plaintiffs Shoreland Zoning Ordinance. The Defendant's never provided any evidence, either testimonial or documentary in nature, to the Plaintiffs Board of Selectpersons detailing their compliance with §15(A)(5) of the Plaintiffs Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.”
69. The Town Attorneys, Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) willfully claimed, “[F]irst, the Defendant's never complied with the minimum lot standards enumerated by §15(A)(5) of the Plaintiffs Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.” After a short explanation, Plaintiff Richard Cayer politely apologized and told Mr. Ouellet and the Board that he would have his tenant remove the last remaining RV trailer from the camp lot. Therefore, Plaintiffs did comply with §15(A)(5) (Count I) by having their tenant remove the last RV, contrary to the Town Attorneys, Richard Currier's Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde's Esq. (#4772) fraud on the courts' statements.
70. The Town Attorneys, Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) willfully claimed to the Courts “[D]efendants never complied with the minimum lot standards enumerated by §15(D)(1) (Count II). The Town's Attorneys, Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) instituted fraud on the courts by claiming that Plaintiffs had to comply with §15(D)(1) Count II. Plaintiffs could not comply with the Town's request, first, because Plaintiffs were not creating a campground, second, there were no RV's to remove on the camp lot after July 6, 2010 or since, and Plaintiffs were vehemently opposed to signing the Consent Agreement and paying a $500 fine, admitting to something they did not do, and agree to pay what Plaintiffs believe to be extortion.
71. Plaintiffs were denied procedural Due Process and equal protection rights (1988 equal protection and Due Process Rights) with Count II because Count II was first filed and claimed against Plaintiffs on February 5, 2013, (895) days after service of the Town's Count I complaint, and (971)(emphasis added) days after the June 29, 2010 Selectmen's regular Board meeting where CEO Ouellet said, and it was confirmed by CEO Ouellet, that there was only one trailer on the lot. CEO Ouellet said “[C]ampground is two or more, so I figure this cannot be a campground……So that’s what I see and today I went to take a look again at the lot, today there’s only one. The little white one is there, the other brownish one is gone.” Therefore, Plaintiffs were denied an opportunity to defend against these fraudulent accusations filed by Attorney Richard Currier Esq. with Count II.
72. Plaintiffs also find it perplexing for the Town to claim Plaintiffs changed the “use” of the tenants RV trailer to another residential dwelling in Count I, and in the other breath claim a new and different code violation in Count II that the camp lot is also now converted into a campground because there had been an RV on the property over two and a half years prior, and none since July 5, 2010. This camp lot is 49 feet by 100 feet.
73. This is especially true since after July 5, 2010, there has only been a single camp on the property with no RV's or trailers. The Town and the courts have also repeated another false claim that there was a mobile home on that lot. This is false. There has never been a mobile home on lot 468, and there has not been an RV/travel trailer on that lot since July 5, 2010.
74. When Plaintiffs first saw the Town's amended Count II filing proposed on November 13, 2012 with the --(Relief Sought from Court) -- which was (1). a Civil Penalty for each day of violation, (2). Removal of Violation, (3) Removal of the two travel trailers, and (4). Attorney fees, witness fees, and costs, Plaintiffs never imagined that any fair and competent court would grant such a motion, and believed rather that the court should impose sanctions pursuant to M.R.Civ.P rule 11. on the Town, and Town Attorney Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) for intentionally making these fraudulent statements on court filed documents.
75. Attorney Currier willfully claimed with fraud on the Courts about (1) there being “[s]everal travel trailer-camper units on a single lot,” because Attorney Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) knew this to be false, and (2) for willfully refiling Count I, to which the Court (Judge Daigle) informed the town that RV's are not Residential dwelling units, and (3) for claiming that “[t]he Town requires a land-use application or Permit for these travel trailers; (if allowed at all).” Plaintiffs proved without any doubt that the Town has never required permits to place RV's or trailers on house or camp lots, and the CEO has never denied anyone from placing RV's or trailers on house or camp lots with, or without a permit, as claimed by Justice Alexander. And, (4) for falsely claiming “[T]he Defendants agreed to sign a Consent Agreement”. This is false, Plaintiffs never agreed to sign a Consent Agreement or pay a fine.
76. Plaintiffs disagree with Attorneys Richard Currier and Jon Plourde that MRE 408 applies to the determination made by (Daigle, J.) at the Judicial settlement conference as claimed in the June 11, 2014 “Brief of Appellee,” because, being told that their claim was not valid/in error, or meritless by Judge Daigle, is not, pursuant to MRE 408, an offer of “[S]ettlement Discussions furnishing, promising, or offering “a valuable consideration.” Willfully applying MRE 408 to prevent the Courts from knowing the truth, that Judge Daigle made clear to Richard Currier, §15(A)(5) (Count I) did not apply to Recreational Vehicles, is an intentional misuse of the MRE 408 intended to willfully falsify the record and facts presented to the Maine Judicial Supreme Court (fraud on the court) with clear knowledge by the Town that Count I was meritless.
77. Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772), the CEO, and the Town, all understood and acknowledged that Count I was without probable cause according to Justice Daigle, can only be seen as applying MRE 408 to justify the intentional misleading of the courts in order to continue filing Count I against Plaintiff. Plaintiffs believe that Attorneys Richard Currier and Jon Plourde should have been sanctioned by Justice Hunter pursuant to Rule 11. M.R.Civ. P. for intentionally misusing MRE 408 to deceive the courts from knowing the truth.
78. The Court (Justice Hunter) granted the Town of Madawaska's Motion to Amend Complaint on January 24, 2013.
79. Included in Attorneys Currier and Plourde's brief in support of the right to file an amendment, Currier claimed, “[A]s M.R. Civ. P. 80K (2) provides “motions for appropriate amendments of the Land Use Citation and Complaint shall be freely granted.” Plaintiffs assert that once an 80K (District Court) complaint is removed to Superior Court, as this case was, it no longer remained an 80K violation. Once Plaintiffs removed the case to Superior Court for a Jury trial, it became an 80B code violation.
80. On February 5, 2013, (895) (emphasis added) days since service of the Town's Complaint, Plaintiffs received the order granting the Town's amended complaint and were stunned that any court would allow the town to amend the complaint with a different violation claim without providing Plaintiffs the equal protection and due process as outlined in §16 (I)(2)(a) under Enforcement.
81. Count I claimed Plaintiffs were converting an RV trailer into a Residential Dwelling exactly as it was originally filed. Plaintiffs believed Count II was another new willful fraud on the court by Attorney Richard Currier and Jon Plourde, that there were now [several] travel trailer-camper units on a single lot, including a mobile home, and that Plaintiffs had now created a new campground. It was at this point approximately 910 days after the first notice of violation filing by the CEO that Plaintiffs understood that the Town, with the Court's deferential protection of municipalities, could, and would continue filing these meritless lawsuits against Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer until Plaintiffs pay the extortion demand for $500 and sign the Consent Agreement admitting to something they did not do forever barring Plaintiffs from allowing tenants to arrive at the camp lot with an RV even though everybody else was allowed. This fraudulent act by the town was clearly seen by Plaintiffs as an abuse of process.
82. Plaintiffs believe these willful acts by the town are an Abuse of Process intended to (1) extort money from Plaintiffs, and (2) requiring Plaintiffs sign a confession to an act they did not commit, (3) for an act that never existed. Attorney Currier's September 9, 2010 letter warning that “[F]ailure to sign and return the Consent Agreement and pay the $500 penalty by September 14, 2010 at 4:00 p.m. shall result in enforcement against you. No payment will be accepted on or after that date and you will be responsible for all Court imposed penalties including legal fees and costs incurred by the Town of Madawaska in these proceedings.”
83. Because there had been no trailer to remove for more than two and a half years, the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure [M.R.Civ.P.] 12B(6) “Failure to state a claim” would or should have applied, or at least that sanctions under Rule 11 of the M.R.Civ.P. should be imposed on the town and it's Attorneys for willful fraud on the Superior Court, and the Maine Supreme Court, claiming inter alia, that Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer placed [several] RV trailers on this [mobile home]camp lot and had a Hearing. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer did not place any RV/trailer on any lot, and was not aware that any RV/trailer had been placed on their rented lot. Simply put, there was no violation, and even if there was a violation, Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were not the violators. They are simply the landowners who corrected the alleged violation.
84. The Town of Madawaska willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs a new written notice of the alleged, new violation, in accordance with the applicable provisions pursuant to §16(H)(2) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance relating to enforcement actions in effect at that time, and the relief sought did not exist (remove 2 travel trailers) except for the $500 fine and signing the Consent Agreement which Plaintiffs believe was a willful act of abuse of process.
85. Because the Town was successful in punishing Plaintiffs with all the delays, and filing of newer, and meritless lawsuits “based on” Plaintiffs exercised their Constitutional rights to public participation in local government, Plaintiffs asked their Attorney to file a Special Motion to Dismiss.
86. Because Plaintiffs Attorney, Mr. Rossignol, was not familiar with the relatively new (1995) Special Motion to Dismiss, anti-SLAPP statute, more time and money was expended for researching the Special Motion to Dismiss.
87. On or about March 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Dismiss the Amended Land Use Citation and Complaint pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 556.
88. On 4-16-2013, Town Attorney Currier filed for enlargement of time.
89. On 4-24-2013, Justice Hunter granted motion for enlargement of time to Attorney Currier. The Special Motion to dismiss language is intended to quickly dismiss meritless lawsuits against the moving party. The Maine anti-Slapp Law clearly states, “[T]he special motion may be advanced on the docket and receive priority over other cases when the court determines that the interests of justice so require.” In Plaintiffs case the courts did the opposite and delayed justice.
90. On August 29, 2013, Town Attorney Currier wrote to Town Manager Christina Therrien telling her, “[J]ustice Cuddy of the Superior Court held a conference today on Mr. Cayer's Special Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. In the course of our discussion, we advised that a recent Supreme Court Decision in the Bradbury v. Town of Eastport might have some bearing on the outcome, Justice Cuddy requested that we submit a Supplemental Brief by September 4th and advised Mr. Cayer to respond by September 9th. He will take the matter under advisement and issue a decision based on the Motions, Briefs and Opposition filed by the parties. A copy of the Supplemental Brief will be sent to you in the next few days.”
91. Title 14 §556 Special Motion to Dismiss clearly states “[A]ll discovery proceedings are stayed upon filing of the special motion under this section, except that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery remains in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the special motion.”
92. None of this was done, which prejudiced Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's filing of the anti-SLAPP statute in violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Right to file and defend themselves pursuant to Title14 §556 Special Motion to Dismiss.
93. In this instant case, Justice Cuddy specifically instructed Town Attorneys Currier and Plourde, to supply the court with a supplemental brief (discovery) with information that Justice Cuddy could and did use to defeat Plaintiffs right to file the anti-SLAPP motion, contrary to the plain language of the Maine statute Title 14 §556 Special Motion to Dismiss.
94. Plaintiffs question the legality, and court rules of such court instructions to defendants to provide the court with specific evidence that could be used to defeat a Special Motion to dismiss.
95. In the Special Motion to Dismiss (anti-SLAPP) Appellee's Brief filing by Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) on page 7, where they willfully made fraud on the court statements to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court claiming there were now “[s]everal (emphasis added) travel trailer-camper units on their lot with a mobile home which constituted a violation of section 15(D)(1).” Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) knew or should have known that nowhere in any related discussions or documents that a claim had been made that there were now, or ever had been, “[s]everal travel trailer-camper units on Plaintiffs lot including a mobile home. These false claims by Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) to the Maine Supreme Court were intended to justify the false Count II allegation that Plaintiffs had created a new campground because two or more trailers were necessary to meet the campground provision §15(D)(1). The definition of “several” is ...” More than two.”
96. Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) also willfully fabricated these false claims on page 13 and elsewhere to the Courts when they claimed, “[T]he amendment directly relates to Richard and Ann Cayer's placement of two travel trailers on their lot on June 3, 2010.” Plaintiffs assert that they never placed, requested, or ordered placement of any RV on their camp lot.
97. In the Special Motion to Dismiss (anti-SLAPP) Appellee's Brief filing by Richard Currier Esq.(#2245), and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772), p.(2) where they willfully made false statements to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court claiming many times, that the “Plaintiffs had placed 2 trailers on their lot”, and held a “Hearing”. They also claimed fraud on the court statements that Plaintiffs received a “notice of public hearing”; and “[O]n June 29, 2010, the Town's Board of Selectpersons proceeded with the “hearing” as to the violation. These are all false claims under oath made by Richard Currier Esq. (#2245), and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) to the Maine Supreme Court to which the Maine Supreme Court repeated in their CASE HISTORY.
98. The false statements repeated by the Maine Supreme Court include;
(1) “[t]o a lot where one mobile home was already located.” There never was a mobile home on this camp lot.
(2) There never was a June 29, 2010 “Hearing” held with Plaintiffs.
(3) Attorney Jon Plourde and The Maine Supreme Judicial Court repeated that the Plaintiffs could appeal the enforcement action -[of the June 29, 2010 meeting]-. This is false. The Madawaska SZO clearly states, on p.35 §16 H Appeals (1)(a) Administrative Appeals, “[A]ny order, requirement, decision or determination made, or failure to act, in the enforcement of this ordinance is not appealable to the Board of Appeals,” and in the alternative, M.R.Civ. P. 80K (e) (2) No Joinder. “[P]roceedings pursuant to this rule shall not be joined with any action other than another proceeding pursuant to this rule, nor shall an alleged violator file a counterclaim or cross-claim.” (at this time, it was an 80K enforcement action.)
(4) The Court also repeated these false statements made by Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) and ignored important facts produced by Plaintiffs such as;
(a) In Note  page 2 of Justice Alexander's CASE HISTORY he repeats many incorrect facts such as, “[W]here one mobile home was already located. This is not so. There has never been a mobile home on that lot.
(b) “[A]s the Cayer’s had not submitted an application to the Town to allow additional trailers.” ... Justice Alexander failed to believe Plaintiffs defense, that no permits had ever been issued for Recreational Vehicles because Recreational Vehicles are licensed and on wheels and have always been allowed on house and camp lots in Madawaska without permits.
(c) Justice Alexander goes on in page 3, “[A]fter a June 29 hearing before the Town Board of Selectmen, during which the Board members heard testimony from the Cayer’s....First, there was no “Hearing”. Second, there was no testimony. For Justice Alexander to believe the Town Attorney’s Richard Currier Esq. (#2245), and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) claims to the Maine Supreme Court over documented material facts Plaintiffs provided in their brief, leads Plaintiffs to believe the Court grants municipalities, as in this case, the Town of Madawaska, too much deference. According to Maine Statute 30-A §2002. Municipality as body corporate; The residents of a municipality are a body corporate which may sue and be sued, appoint Attorneys and adopt a seal. It is unimaginable that the courts ignored the plain, simple fact, that the Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were not the violators, and that there was no violation.
(d) Justice Alexander goes on in page 3, “[T]he Cayer’s did not appeal the Board's June 2010 decision to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R.Civ. P. 80B.” The plain fact is that after the June 29, 2010 Board of Selectmen's meeting Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer followed up with 2 letters dated August 4, and August 18, 2010, trying to set up a Hearing to discuss the alleged violation; however, the Board willfully did not respond to Plaintiffs letters. Furthermore, Justice Alexander is familiar with M.R.Civ. P. 80K (e) (2) No Joinder. “[P]roceedings pursuant to this rule shall not be joined with any action other than another proceeding pursuant to this rule, nor shall an alleged violator file a counterclaim or cross-claim.”
(e) On page (4) Justice Alexander goes on by stating “[T]he amended complaint alleged an additional violation of section §15(D)(1) of the ordinance, “[b]ut alleged no additional facts.” Justice Alexander should have been aware that the amended Count II complaint did not reflect in any manor the violation of Count I which was a claim by the town that the Plaintiffs were creating a Residential Dwelling Unit, which is what the Town was allowed to amend. Rather, the town willfully filed a new violation claiming the Plaintiffs were now creating a new campground. The Superior Court did not provide Plaintiffs' their Due Process rights for a new notice of violation. The CEO also violated Plaintiffs rights because he did not apply the mandatory provisions of §16 I(2)(a) for count II.
(f) Count II claimed that Plaintiffs were creating a new campground two and a half years (910 days) (emphasis added) after Plaintiffs removed both RV's from their properties. Plaintiffs fail to understand how the Town can file a new and completely different code violation 910 days after the original complaint, “[b]ut alleged no additional facts.” Plaintiffs believe this to be a violation of their Constitutionally protected procedural due process rights for a “Hearing” and to a proper notice of violation pursuant to §16 I(2)(a).
(g) Justice Alexander goes on; Note;  “[A]lthough the Cayer’s filed the special motion to dismiss 131 days after the Town filed its motion to amend, they did not request leave from the court to file the motion beyond the anti-SLAPP statute's sixty-day time limitations.”
(h) The Court failed to apply the common Law, and court rule that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court adopted and applied “the challenged pleading,” as in this instant case which was Count II. For the Plaintiffs Count II was the trigger, the final straw, the instant that Plaintiffs decided to apply the Special Motion to Dismiss. The Law is unambiguous and clear. “[W]hen the moving party asserts (emphasis added) ....” is when a special motion to dismiss is filed. Not before! Filing any meritless lawsuit, including a Special Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs believe is not ripe for adjudication is subject to court sanctions. It is also absurd to claim that the anti-SLAPP must be filed at the onset of a complaint, as claimed by justice Cuddy. The anti-SLAPP should only be filed “[W]hen the moving party asserts that the civil claims.... are based on the moving party's exercise of the moving party's right of petition under the Constitution of the United States...the moving party may bring a Special Motion to Dismiss. “
(i) On page 3 of the Law Court decision/ CASE HISTORY the court states, “[A]s of August 2010, the Cayer’s had not paid the assessed civil penalty or signed a Consent Agreement.” Because Plaintiffs voluntarily corrected the alleged violation by removing the RV from their properties before being instructed to, Plaintiffs assert the Town abused the [legal] process by willfully bringing a meritless lawsuit and demanding Plaintiffs sign a fraudulent Consent Agreement, admitting to something the Town clearly understood to be false, and pay a $500 penalty. Plaintiffs told the town this was extortion.
(j) Note:  of the Law Court decision points out how Maine's Special Motion to Dismiss is different from any other anti-SLAPP law because “[T]he statute broadly defines “a party's exercise of its right of petition to include any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,....or any other governmental .....,” and yet did not even give the Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer the benefit of the doubt and make an effort to understand the facts of the case, when it wrote, Note: (11). “[T]he Cayer’s contend that this language authorizes individuals to invoke the anti-SLAPP laws to obtain dismissal of State or local actions seeking to enforce laws with which the individuals disagree or do not wish to comply particularly when, as here, the individuals have had prior disagreements with the State or Local government seeking to enforce law. Nothing in the anti-SLAPP statute or its history expresses or even implies that it would protect the Cayer’s from the Town's efforts to enforce an ordinance limiting the number of trailers that they are permitted to maintain on their land.” Plaintiffs respectfully respond to these incorrect claims by the court by saying, “[n]nothing could be further from the truth.”
99. In 2010, Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer owned the only campground in the town of Madawaska. An ordinance prohibiting RV's, trailers, or any camping facility on any house or camp lot would have increased tremendously the demand, and price for a site, campground income, and business value of the Cayer campground.
100. Although it would have been in the Plaintiffs favor to prevent RV's from being on house and camp lots, Plaintiffs never once asked for this to be enforced (except for the Rouleau DEP violation SZO §15E.), because it was not illegal. Plaintiffs did not believe it would have been fair to prevent anyone wishing to park and use a RV/trailer on anyone's house or camp lot. Note: Because Rouleau was the one complaining most of the time, and because Rouleau's lot had been illegally subdivided, and because Rouleau placed structures in violation of Maine SZO, and because Rouleau built an illegal cesspool on the lot, and because Rouleau's illegally subdivided lot had an Individual Private Campsite in violation of Maine's SZO, pursuant to §15. E. Plaintiff Richard Cayer pointed out to the CEO and the Board of Selectmen that the person complaining about an RV on Plaintiffs camp lot, Rouleau himself had up to 5 RV's on his property. It is important to note that in 2012 while the town was bringing an enforcement action against Rouleau for the illegally placed structures on the same Rouleau lot, the Town ignored the cesspool violation and the fact that there still was an RV camper trailer on the same lot 2 years after the town brought an enforcement action against the Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer. The camper trailer was still being used on the illegally subdivided lot, on an illegal Individual Private Campsite pursuant to §15 E of the Town SZO. The CEO ignored those violations at the Rouleau lot while Plaintiffs were in court for the instant RV case. (emphasis added)
101. It was for this reason when Plaintiff Richard Cayer complained about all the campers and tents on the illegally subdivided Rouleau lot that Selectman Lloyd Tardiff told Richard Cayer at a Madawaska Selectmen meeting, “[B]ick Cayer you are not going to prevent the town from allowing RV's and trailers on house and camp lots in Madawaska.” And, at another Selectmen meeting, Selectman Bob Williams told Plaintiff Richard Cayer when he complained about another RV trailer on the Rouleau lot “[I]t is legal to have the RV/trailer on the lot as long as the owner approves and it is licensed.”
102. Attorney R. Currier was allowed to amend Count I; an alleged §15 A (5) for a change of use to a residential dwelling unit, that Judge Daigle made clear did not apply because, “[R]ecreational vehicles are not residential dwelling units.” Based on Plaintiffs understanding of the Madawaska SZO, Plaintiffs did not believe that the courts would allow the Town to file a new violation without the proper notice of violation and a corrective action as provided pursuant to 16(H)(2) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance. Plaintiffs were shocked on January 24, 2013 that any court in the United States of America would allow such a miscarriage of Justice. For this reason, the Plaintiffs never took the notice to file as proposed by the Town on November 14, 2012 seriously because they did not believe any court would ever allow another meritless code violation without the proper notices pursuant to the SZO 16 (I) Enforcement. There was never any doubt, and it was very clear in both Plaintiffs minds, that for many years the Town was discriminating and punishing the Cayer’s because Plaintiffs were filing lawsuits against them.
103. It was only after this second meritless lawsuit was filed by the Town that Plaintiffs were convinced that this action by the Town was only intended to punish the Plaintiffs by filing meritless lawsuits, and they would continue unless Plaintiffs could stop them, the only way they knew how, which was with the courts. Therefore, at that time, and for reasons clearly outlined in the Maine Legislation pursuant to M.R.S.A Title 14: §556 Special Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs decided to file the Special Motion to Dismiss against the town because this was the instant, “[W]hen a moving party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaim or cross claims against the moving party are based on the moving party's exercise of the moving party's right of petition....”
104. Based on all previous Title14: §556 Special Motion to Dismiss decisions by the Maine Supreme Court, Plaintiffs understand the Courts great disdain for the anti-SLAPP law and would never file such a claim again unless the Maine Legislature amends the statute and, or, subjects the Special Motion to Dismiss to the M.R.Civ. P similar to California's anti-SLAPP laws.
105. Plaintiffs disagree with the courts' past decisions abrogating the Special Motion to Dismiss into common Law, contrary to its intent Inter alia, especially the use of Bradbury v. City of Eastport for establishing case Law to determine when or whether a Special Motion to Dismiss is timely or not. In Bradbury, the court (J Silver) has decided “[A]lthough the statute uses the word “complaint,” we interpret the sixty-day period as running from the date of service of the challenged pleading, as the statute expressly permits special motions to dismiss “civil claims, counterclaim or cross claims,” which may or may not themselves be served within the sixty days of the complaint.”
106. In Justice Cuddy's Discussion he claims, “[I]n Count 2, no additional facts are alleged but it is alleged that these underlying facts also constitute a violation of Section §15. D.1 of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.”
107. Justice Cuddy also claims “[T]he claims or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” The first Count I complaint by the town claimed Plaintiffs were creating a new Residential Dwelling until Judge Daigle said it did not apply to §15(A)(5). §15(D)(1) Count II claimed that Plaintiffs were creating a new campground even though there had not been a RV on said lot for over 971days because Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer had the parties responsible for placing those RV's on Plaintiffs land remove them and did not allow any more RV's on said lot.
108. Justice Cuddy also claims “[w]e interpret the sixty-day period as running from the date of service to the challenged pleading...” The challenged pleading in this case is Count II. The new Count II code violation “challenged pleading” was entered in the docket on February 1, 2013 and the Cayer's filed the anti-SLAPP on March 25, 2013.
109. Notwithstanding this fact, the Maine Supreme Court ignored the timeliness of the filing of the anti-SLAPP which was on appeal, and arbitrarily and capriciously ruled, “[B]ecause we conclude that this was not an appropriate circumstance for application of the anti-SLAPP statute, we affirm the judgment for reasons different from those stated by the trial court.”
110. The simple facts of this case cry out for a Special Motion to Dismiss because: Fact (1). The Cayer’s are not the alleged violators, they are the landowners. Fact (2). There never was a violation and the Town, the Town's Attorneys, and the CEO knew it, and were successful in convincing the court by willfully repeating fraudulent material facts such as; Several, Hearing, Notice of Hearing, agreed to sign Consent Agreement, agreed to remove 2 trailers, etc.etc., to the point the Maine Supreme Court failed to understand, or investigate court documents, material facts, and finally simply claimed “[T]his is not such a case.”
111. Plaintiffs believe the Bradbury rule by the Maine Judicial Supreme Court for determining when a Special Motion to Dismiss should be filed is in derogation to the statute. “[W]hen a reasonable interpretation of a statute would satisfy constitutional requirements, we apply that interpretation. Francis S. Driscoll JR. et.al. v. Ernest w. Mains JR. Et al. See Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, 9, 794 A.2d 62, 66-67.
112. On June 11, 2014, Attorney Richard Currier filed the Brief of Appellee in relation to ARO-14-51. In this brief on page 19, Jon Plourde states, “[I]n this matter, the Superior Court never addressed the merits or lack of merits of Appellants Special Motion to Dismiss. (A. Tab 3).
113. The Special Motion to dismiss is clear, “[T]he court shall grant the special motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party's exercise of its right of petition was devoid ......in making its determination, the court shall consider the pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”
114. Plaintiffs claim the Superior Court (J. Cuddy) decision without addressing the merits or lack of merits of Appellants Special Motion to Dismiss, violated Plaintiffs rights that led to a costly Supreme Court appeal where once again the court failed to apply the statute as intended.
115. Title 14: §556 the Special Motion to Dismiss is clear, “[T]he Special Motion to Dismiss may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms the court determines proper.” The simple and clear language of the statute allows “[i]n the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms the court determines proper” can only be achieved after the court understands the “merits” of the case. Attorney Plourde made clear this was not done.
116. The Special Motion to Dismiss is clear, the determination of when, or if, the Special Motion to Dismiss should be filed is a decision that must only be made by the moving party, and only “[W]hen a moving party asserts....” The courts should not be allowed to make that determination, as claimed by Justice Cuddy in his cv-12-155 decision claiming, “[I]t is noted that the Special Motion to Dismiss is intended to be filed at the commencement of the action to minimize expense in terms of litigation cost.”
117. Plaintiffs believe that unless the courts can assure every moving party they will not sanction a moving party for any filing of the anti-SLAPP statute, the courts should apply the statute as intended. The 60-day period for filing is not mandatory, it simply allows when the anti-SLAPP “may” be filed. The determination when or if it should be filed must be “[W]hen a moving party asserts that...the moving party may (emphasis added) bring a Special Motion to Dismiss.” Or, “[i]n the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms the court determines proper.” In order for this level of judgement to be made fairly, the court must apply facts, and issues of the motion which was not done in Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's case because the Plaintiffs would not be the violator even (IF) there had actually been a violation.
118. Because of this perceived error by the Supreme Court, Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer continued to be punished by the Town, causing them to endure many more (8) years of much undeserved financial loss, and irreparable pain and suffering inflicted on them willfully by the Town of Madawaska and its employees.
119. Superior Court (Cuddy, J.) also requested that the Town Attorneys file supplemental briefs contrary to the State statute, adding more delays and costs to Plaintiffs contrary to the statute’s intent.
120. Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe this request to the Town attorneys by J. Cuddy to supply him with a supplemental brief on the Bradbury Law Court decision to be used as the deciding factor was a violation of court rules, Law, and Plaintiffs rights.
121. The Special Motion to Dismiss is unambiguous, “[A]ll discovery proceedings are stayed upon the filing of the Special Motion under this section, except that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery remains in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the Special Motion. [1995, c. 413, §1 (NEW).] (3) Cuddy allowed supplemental briefs.”
122. Ultimately, the Superior Court (Cuddy, J.) denied Plaintiffs Special Motion to Dismiss based on Bradbury.
123. J. Cuddy goes on “[L]ikewise the procedure provided in Rule 80K is designed for expeditious resolution of a land use violation.” “[C]learly, for a variety of reasons, the policy goals of the legislation and civil rules were not accomplished.”
124. Apparently, J. Cuddy failed to understand once a claim is removed from District Court it is no longer an 80K violation.
125. It took Justice Cuddy Ten (10) months to adjudicate this case, partly because of the supplemental briefs and “[T]he Court's traveling schedule cause it to be delayed in getting to this matter.” Maine and California's anti-SLAPP statutes of both States have similar language, except for the “Governmental actions.” “[T]he special motion may be advanced on the docket and receive priority over other cases when the court determines that the interests of justice so require.” Adjudication of anti-SLAPP cases in California takes a few weeks. (It must be on the docket within 30 days). In the State of Maine, the time for an anti-SLAPP to be adjudicated is approximately 10 months.
126. The Law Court ignored the crucial facts, (1) that the Cayer's were not the person responsible for the meritless lawsuit, (2) there were no violations, and (3) Plaintiffs removed both RV's before even asked by the Town. Therefore, according to §16.I(3) Legal Actions: Legal actions for fines and Consent Agreements are not allowed and are only legal “[W]hen the above action does not result in the correction or abatement of the violation or nuisance condition......”
127. Plaintiffs claim, the willful failure by the Town, it's CEO, and Attorney Richard Currier Esq. to provide Plaintiffs with all the procedural Due Process protections of all the steps required in Madawaska SZO §16. I. Enforcement, violated Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's equal protection and due process rights pursuant to 42 §§ 1983 and 1988.
128. The Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) successfully defended claims for Count I and Count II in both, the Maine Superior Court, and the Maine Judicial Supreme Court, against Plaintiffs by fraud on the court about material facts such as, inter alia, the M.R.E 408 claim that Plaintiffs could not repeat Judge Daigle’s decision of August 9, 2012 because it was a settlement offer.
129. The Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) also willfully and with fraud on the court, claimed that permits were required for RV's and trailers, that Plaintiffs had Hearings, Notice of Hearings, and that the Cayer’s placed several trailers on their lot and the lot had a mobile home, and Plaintiffs had to “[r]emoval of 2 trailers”, these were violations of §15(A)(5), and §15(D)(1).
130. Based on this information, the Maine Supreme Court incorrectly concluded, “[T]he Cayers contend that this language authorizes individuals to invoke the anti-SLAPP laws to obtain dismissal of State or local actions to enforce laws with which the individuals disagree or do not wish to comply particularly when, as here, the individuals have had prior disagreements with the State or local government seeking to enforce the law.”
131. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were successful in five (5) out of five (5) appeals before the Maine Superior Court against the Town for code related issues from 2003 to 2008.
132. Plaintiffs have on many occasions told the Selectpersons, and CEO that Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer have no problem respecting the Town's codes. All Plaintiffs want is for the code to be applied evenly, fairly, and consistently.
133. Circa 2006, Plaintiff Richard Cayer wrote a letter for DEP Richard Baker requesting that he come to Madawaska to educate the members of all Boards including the Selectpersons, Planning Board, and Board of Appeals, about the law and how to apply it consistently.
134. Based on the willful fraud on the court material facts provided by the Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq. (#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772), the Maine Judicial Supreme Court concluded “[T]his is not such a case.” “[B]ased upon the plain language of the statute and its limited scope of application, we conclude that the anti-SLAPP statute cannot, in ordinary circumstances (emphasis added) such as those presented here, be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants' alleged violations of law.”
135. At the onset of the decision by Justice Alexander, he asserts “[T]his is not such a case.” Based upon the plain language of the statute and its limited scope of application...” Plaintiffs believe, Maine's Special Motion to Dismiss statute is known to have the most liberal language in all of the United States of America allowing the anti-SLAPP statute to be filed against any governmental proceeding; (emphasis added) including written or oral statement .....by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; ...or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to petition government.” Furthermore, Justice Alexander included note 8 in his decision which stated, “[T]he enacting bill's brief statement of fact does indicate, however, that the Legislature intended for a Special Motion to Dismiss to apply to those claims or counterclaims filed for retributory or otherwise frivolous reasons. This bill allows a person exercising the first amendment right to bring an action and if a counterclaim is filed against that person for apparently dilatory expense incurring reasons or other frivolous reasons for seeking redress and accord, then that person has a right to a Motion to Dismiss and have that motion advanced so that the motion can be heard as soon as possible and if the Motion to Dismiss is granted, to have the case dismissed as soon as possible.”
136. The Plaintiffs filed the Special Motion to Dismiss on March 25, 2013 and the Supreme Judicial Court decision was filed on November 4, 2014, one year and eight months, or almost 20 months and tens of thousands of dollars later. For this reason, inter alia, Plaintiffs believe the courts failed to protect the Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer Constitutional Rights, or fulfill the legislative intent of the Special Motion to Dismiss statute.
137. The Maine Judicial Supreme Court believed and accepted the willful fraud on the court claims by the Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) when they asserted, “[w]e conclude that the anti-SLAPP statute cannot, in ordinary circumstances such as those presented here, be invoked to thwart a local government enforcement action commenced to address the defendants' alleged violations of law.”
138. The Maine Judicial Supreme Court believed that Count I and Count II were “[o]rdinary circumstances” and (1) did not believe Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were simply the landowners who corrected the false claim by the town, and were not the violators. And, (2) that there were no violations. Two very simple facts to understand.
139. Ten (10) months after the Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) successfully defended claims for Count I and Count II in both, the Maine Superior Court, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, against Plaintiffs anti-SLAPP, the Town of Madawaska changed its position180 degrees from what Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) told the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under oath when the RV matter came for trial during the Superior Court's September 15, 2015 trial term.
140. At the September 2015 trial term for the RV violation, the Town immediately sought to dismiss the RV actions pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41. Because Plaintiffs had filed a written response denying the Land Use Citation and Complaint the Town could not do so. Plaintiffs refused to allow the town to simply “Dismiss” this meritless lawsuit against them. The Town then offered to dismiss both actions unilaterally, the RV, and the building violation, but could not do so because Plaintiffs believed the building violation was also meritless, and filed willfully and fraudulently to pressure Plaintiff's into dismissing the secession case. This was the same code violation that Town Manager Christina Therrien, Chairman Vince Frallicciardi, and Selectman David Morin had CEO Ouellet initiate an inspection on 43 hours (emphasis added) after Plaintiff R. Cayer filed their petition to secede on May 28, 2013. This was the same day the Chairman of the Board Don Chasse resigned, and was replaced by Vince Frallicciardi as Chairperson. Moreover, this is the same code violation that Chairman Vince Frallicciardi and Selectman David Morin told Plaintiffs they would help them with if Plaintiffs agreed to dismissed the secession petition. Plaintiffs again refused, and demanded their right to a jury trial allowing the truth to come out. The Town then attempted to dismiss both cases with prejudice, and again plaintiffs refused to allow the town to dismiss any case, even with prejudice because they wanted the facts of what the town and Currier had to them to come out in public.
141. After the Town prevailed in a decision by Justice Hunter against a Special Motion to Dismiss in Superior Court, the Town was now offering to Dismiss with Prejudice the very same building code violation Justice Hunter had just decided in the Town's favor against a Special Motion to Dismiss.
142. Following the Plaintiffs refusal to Dismiss with Prejudice both code violations, defendant's Attorney Richard Currier Esq. requested to delay the trial based on the claim that the CEO Ouellet had been fired, and the Town Manager Christina Therrien had resigned as Town Manager, and that they may be hostel witnesses.
143. Plaintiffs disagreed with Justice Hunters decision to grant delay of the jury trial because the CEO had been fired and the Town manager had quit.
144. Plaintiffs believe that Justice Hunter should have questioned Attorney Currier's credibility and honesty especially after Justice Hunter had just denied Plaintiffs their Special Motion to Dismiss for the very same building violation on March 10, 2015 in favor of Currier/Plourde and the Town. Currier and Plourde's reasons why Plaintiffs should not be allowed to succeed with a Special Motion to Dismiss was based on this statement. “[M]unicipalities suffer actual injury when their ordinances are not followed by their citizenry, because that municipalities’ Comprehensive Plan is unable to be realized without strict compliance.”
145. Seven months after the Town successfully convinced the court, (Justice Hunter), that the Plaintiffs should not be allowed to prevail with the filing of a Special Motion to Dismiss the alleged building violation, the Town attorney was now determined to Dismiss with Prejudice the very same anti-SLAPP case providing dispositive evidence that their claims were willful fraud on the court statements simply to deny Plaintiff's filings.
146. Based on the fact that this case had been filed more than 5 years prior (emphasis added) and now key players were leaving the town employment, and Boards were changing, more delays would clearly compound this problem against Plaintiffs. It is for this reason, Plaintiffs believed they were denied justice because of Justice Hunters decisions. Plaintiffs assert that because Justice was delayed, Justice was denied.”
147. When the matter came on for jury trial a second time during the September 2016 trial term, the Town sought to dismiss the two code violations unilaterally once again, but could not do so pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41 because Plaintiffs had filed a written response and denial to the Land Use Citation and Complaint and Plaintiffs wanted the facts of what the Town, the Town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had willfully done to them, come out in public.
148. After Plaintiffs confirmed and made clear to the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) that Plaintiffs did not consent to the Town’s Dismissal with Prejudice, Justice Stewart personally informed the Plaintiffs in a second round of discussions that a Dismissal with Prejudice was an unusually good offer, and that the Plaintiffs should reconsider the offer. Fearing retaliation from the court, Plaintiffs reluctantly accepted the Town’s Dismissal of the action with Prejudice, with the understanding that Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer intended to file a tort lawsuit against the Town and its employees. The Dismissal with Prejudice was noted on the Docket Record on September 6, 2016.
149. It is important to note that at this court proceeding before Justice Stewart, the Town had Dismissed with Prejudice two code violation lawsuits that the Town, the Town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had successfully defended in two (2) Special Motion to Dismiss (anti-SLAPP) lawsuits in two (2) previous Superior Courts decided by Justice Cuddy and Justice Hunter and one Supreme Judicial Court decision.
150. It is also important to note that at this court proceeding before Justice Stewart, the Town also Dismissed with Prejudice one code violation lawsuit that the Town, the Town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had successfully defended in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court against Plaintiffs Special Motion to Dismiss by claiming “[M]unicipalities suffer actual injury when their ordinances are not followed by their citizenry, because that municipalities’ Comprehensive Plan is unable to be realized without strict compliance.”
151. Because of this Maine Supreme Judicial Court RV decision against Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer’s' Special Motion to dismiss, the Cayer’s reputation will forever be unjustly damaged because the Law Court has established, and has already applied in Law Court decisions, that the Cayer anti-SLAPP case was “[N]ot such a case,” when in reality it was exactly, “such a case.”
152. The Town’s Dismissal of the action with Prejudice was not made pursuant to any settlement agreement between the parties, and Plaintiffs did not pay or receive any consideration of any kind in connection with the Dismissal of the action with Prejudice.
153. Because the Town was allowed to Dismiss with Prejudice without any settlement agreements, the Town is allowed to deny RV's onto Plaintiffs camp lot without a permit and are denied the right to allow 2 RV's onto their lot. All other citizens are allowed to place one (1) or more than two (2) on their lots without permits. This discrimination against Plaintiffs continues today.
154. Plaintiffs provided Defendants notice of their tort claims against Defendants by a Notice of Claim served on Defendants on or about November 13, 2016 in compliance with the provisions of 14 M.R.S. § 8107 of the Maine Tort Claims Act.
LOT 468 BUILDING VIOLATIONS GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
155. On May 21, 2008, Plaintiffs applied for a land use building permit requesting to remove a portion of a camp on lot 468 and expand according to the Town Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO) 12C(1) Expansions.
156. On June 4, 2008, Plaintiffs received a letter from the town advising them that the plumbing inspector Don Deschaine would meet with them to determine if the same septic system could be used for the new expansion.
157. On June 6, 2008, the plumbing inspector informed Plaintiffs that the septic system was functioning properly and that Plaintiffs could go forward with the new construction.
158. On July 21, 2008, the CEO Bob Ouellet informed the Plaintiffs they would have to meet with the Planning Board to determine the greatest practical extent from the high-water mark.
159. Because the CEO determined that Planning Board approval was necessary since more than 50% of the market value of the camp was being removed and the new expansion required a foundation §12 C(1)(b) applied, and the Planning Board had to apply §12 C(2) of the Madawaska SZO to determine the greatest practical extent from the HWM. Based on the CEO's reason for Planning Board review, Plaintiffs decided to amend the permit application to remove all the camp as suggested by the CEO Ouellette July 14, 2008.
160. On July 29, 2008, the CEO sent Plaintiffs a letter claiming that a meeting with the Board of Appeals was also necessary because Plaintiffs permit was requesting to in-fill, or increase in non-conformance. It is an undisputable fact that CEO Ouellet had always allowed the side yard setback “increase in nonconformance” of a structure, or aka, in-filling and the SZO had not changed since 2004. This increase of nonconformance was always allowed and was never subject to a Board of appeals variance. Specific language amending the SZO to prevent in-filling was willfully and fraudulently added in 2009 by the Town Manager Christina Therrien and CEO Ouellet without anyone's knowledge.
161. It is important to note that the first time the CEO fraudulently required a variance for in-filling was in 2007 during Plaintiffs Superior Court appeal of the BOA decision. Moreover, at both, the 2006 Planning Board meetings, and the BOA meeting, the CEO made very clear that Plaintiffs were allowed to in-fill because this had always been allowed. Because Plaintiffs won their appeal in Superior Court against the town, the CEO changed that policy and denied Plaintiffs the very same right the CEO told both Boards, that the Cayer’s can in-fill because '[I]n-filling has always been allowed. Plaintiffs view this differential treatment as willful discrimination.
162. On August 7, 2008, CEO Ouellet sent Plaintiffs a letter informing them that Plaintiffs had amended the application not to include in-filling, or aka increase in nonconformance, and BOA variance was not necessary. Second, that the Planning Board will determine the greatest practical extent from the High-Water Line. (HWL). Third, “[E]nclosed you will find a copy of the Maine Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Rules concerning replacement structures for your review. This section would apply to the required septic disposal system for any replacement structure.” Although the CEO included this information in his letter, he never mentioned it at the August 7, 2008 Planning Board hearing, but did use it in October 6, 2008 as a reason why he did not issue the permit.
163. It was only in 2009, two years after the Town willfully and fraudulently refused to allow in-filling for Plaintiffs camp, that the Town Manager Christina Therrien and CEO Ouellet were successful in fraudulently amending the SZO denying in-filling or increase in non-conformance.
164. The illegal in-filling amendment of 2009 was once again overturned in 2016, after Plaintiff Richard Cayer made the Madawaska Planning Board aware that it had been secretly amended to prevent in-filling in 2009.
165. At the August 25, 2008, Planning Board hearing CEO Ouellet asked “are you removing the whole building?” Plaintiff Richard Cayer replied, “yes, that is what we are doing.”
166. At the August 25, 2008 Planning Board meeting, a motion by Ron Dalgo “[t]o accept the land use application for a replacement location for a seasonal dwelling at the greatest practical extent from the normal high-water line for Richard and Ann Cayer.” second by Gary Dufour. All in favor, Motion carried.
167. Because the Madawaska Planning Board does not issue permits, Plaintiffs had to wait for the CEO to issue the permit as approved by the Planning Board.
168. On October 6, 2008, the CEO willfully and fraudulently sent Plaintiffs a letter outlining 5 highlighted requirements that needed to be addressed before a permit could be issued. The letter read, “[F]finally, I am returning the application for you to complete the highlighted portion. Once I receive the completed application, I will be able to determine the permit fee and discuss the internal plumbing permit with you.” Among these issues were questions on the septic system.
169. Although Plaintiffs were not required to include this information because the Plumbing Inspector Don Deschaine had approved the existing system, Plaintiffs supplied the CEO with a new septic plan. Furthermore, whenever a permit application is presented to the Planning Board, these issues that CEO Ouellet was requesting were supposed to have been addressed and the Planning Board decision is final, and the permit issued.
170. On November 6, 2008, CEO Ouellet willfully and fraudulently Informed Plaintiffs that he had received the permit application with the required completed information that he had requested in his October 6, 2008 letter; however, Plaintiffs now had to meet new requirements concerning non-vegetation that had already been addressed by Plaintiff and CEO.
171. Because of health and legal issues (Supreme Court ARO-09-45 contempt of court) and the 2010 (CARSC-CB-12-155) RV violation, Plaintiffs were not able to continue the permitting or building process.
172. On April 10, 2012, Plaintiffs applied for a new building permit for a replacement structure at the same camp lot as approved at the August 25, 2008 Planning Board meeting.
173. On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff sent CEO Ouellet a letter explaining “this is to replace and supplement the previous permit application dated May 21, 2008 Under Comments, Plaintiff added, (unless we have to go to the Planning Board.) The Town has a long history of making Plaintiffs attend Planning Board, Selectmen, and Board of Appeals meetings unnecessarily.
174. On April 23, 2012, CEO Ouellet emailed Stephenie Maclagan of DEP with willful fraudulent statements such as, (1) “[I] would need interpretation of section 12 non-conformance letter D non-conforming Uses #2 the last sentence. Does this mean that if a person has a camp that has fallen in disrepair, no electricity connection from the power company, no propane cylinders installed, and no real landscape upkeep to the property in the last 5-6 years, that if the removal of all structures, sic, that he has lost his grandfathered status of, setback from normal high water line, 20% non-vegetation, and height requirement? Or does it mean that the Planning Board has to review the application for the best practical location, and follow the normal vegetation, setback, and height requirements, as though it was an empty lot. Let me know what you think.” Plaintiffs believe this to be an important material fact. The significance is that CEO is making claim that the camp may not be grandfathered because it is in disrepair, no electricity, etc. Most of these statements are fraudulently and willfully false. An example is that for every year we rented the camp and it had electricity.
175. DEP Stephenie MacLagan responded on April 26, 2012. Section 12.D does not apply. Her letter went on to advise Planning Board review and explained how to do it. Plaintiffs believe this is basic code enforcement, permit review by the Planning Board and CEO, and everyday function by the Planning Board to know how to determine the greatest practical extent from the high-water mark.
176. On April 26, 2012, Stephenie Maclagan responded to the CEO's letter correcting CEO Ouellet although he knew better, and Plaintiffs believe he was fishing for a way to prevent Plaintiffs from being allowed to build.
177. On April 26, 2012, CEO Ouellet sent Plaintiffs a certified letter that read, “[y]our applications request a replacement structure, larger than the existing structure, unless it has to be reviewed by the Planning Board.... to make the application easier to understand for myself and/or the Planning Board, please complete 2 different sketches. Once I receive this new application, I will then review it and if required, schedule a Planning Board/Board of Appeals meeting”.
178. On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended application complete with drawings.
179. On May 01, 2012, CEO Ouellet received a letter from the Maine Subsurface wastewater unit project manager, James Jacobsen, stating “[A] malfunctioning system cannot be used to serve a replacement structure.”
180. The Town of Madawaska posted the agenda for the Planning Board Public Meeting scheduled to be on Thursday, May 10, 2012. At this public meeting, CEO Ouellet willfully provided the Planning Board fraudulently obtained information from DEP Stephenie Maclagan without informing Plaintiffs of the information.
181. At the Planning Board meeting, Plaintiffs explained the reason why they did not want to meet with the Planning Board was because the Planning Board had already decided the greatest practical extent from the HWM in 2008, and then asked the question, “[W]hy are we even here?”
182. The response from the CEO Ouellet was, “[A]w Bick, you would have been upset if I didn't.” CEO Ouellet said this even after Plaintiffs application said in his April 17, 2012 letter, “Unless we have to go to the Planning Board.”
183. The minutes show Jeff Albert who had resigned from the Planning Board in 2006 moved to table the Cayer request as noted in Article 4 and wait “until Mr. Cayer can present to the Planning Board a valid septic plan for the lot;” seconded by V. Sirois. Motion Carried.
184. It is important to note that Jeff Albert had resigned from the Planning Board in 2006 and was not sworn in as a Planning Board member. Jeff Albert later did become a Planning Board member and Plaintiffs assert that the reason he was there was to prevent Plaintiffs from successfully defending themselves. Jeff Albert only attended Plaintiffs issues and quit again after Plaintiffs were charged by the town.