INTERROGATORY - Violation of Constitutional and Civil Rights Continued PART 2
185. On May 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a new application to repair the old camp and on May 17, 2012 CEO Ouellet granted the permit. Plaintiff realized that no portion of the old camp could meet the new State rules under Mubec and pursuant to the town SZO §12 B(2). Because Plaintiff understood that they were under much greater scrutiny then everyone else, they decided to expand the camp pursuant to §12 C (1) of the SZO which would result in replacing most of the old camp that could not meet the town and State building codes.
186. Based on the August 25, 2008 Planning Board meeting where the Planning Board determined the greatest practical extent location of the new replacement camp, (structure) Plaintiffs understood they could expand and or replace the old camp. On May 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed another permit application for expansions to existing camp to increase floor space and add a second floor with a cathedral ceiling and a loft.
187. On May 29, 2012, CEO Ouellet issued a permit and included the Project Description: “[E]xtention of Existing Camper and Addition by Constructing Steel Framework for a second floor 16' by 20'. Construct 2nd Floor with loft and Cathedral Ceiling. Height of Bldg shall be no higher than 20' within 75' of NHWL from existing ground level in Front. Dye testing of Septic System is required. New Construction shall be no closer than 5 ft. From property line.”
188. It is important to note this is the same permit which CEO Ouellet and Town Attorney's claim, “[O]n May 22, 2012, I received from Richard and Ann a land use permit application to remove less than fifty (50%) percent of an existing structure on their lot , and to add an addition to an existing structure on their lot which meets the requirements of the Town's SZO. After reviewing their land use permit application, I granted it on May 29, 2012 with conditions.” CEO Ouellet and Town Manager Christina Therrien willfully repeated these fraudulent statements about the permits being issued for “less than 50% removal, and under §12 C (3) to justify the meritless code violations.
189. Plaintiffs assert that it was impossible to leave the old camp inside the new expansion especially “with loft and Cathedral Ceiling” as allowed with the new permit.
190. Based on the Plaintiffs difficult past history with the CEO and the Town concerning building permits, it was at this time Plaintiffs believe the CEO may now be granting Plaintiffs permits without the usual discrimination and difficulty with the intention of later revoking the permits, after Plaintiffs started to build. Although Plaintiff was certain, that the old camp could be removed based on the 2008 Planning Board decision for the greatest practical extent(GPE), Plaintiff began construction by removing only parts of the old camp that was necessary for construction of the new foundation, until the expansion increased the value of the camp by more than 50% of the market value of the structure before removal, pursuant to the town SZO §12C(3) as the CEO had done to another landowner, Harold Pelletier.
191. On June 14, 2012, CEO Ouellet sent Plaintiffs a letter explaining that he had conducted a test on our septic system and wrote, “[O]n this day, it appears that the system is functioning properly.” The CEO said this in spite of his October 6, 2008 letter from Jim Jacobson with a copy of the Maine Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Rules.
192. On June 18, 2012, Plaintiffs filed for another permit that was quickly granted on June 18, 2012 by CEO Ouellet for “45'x12' extension to Existing Structure. A 20' section of the recently purchased mobile home (65'x12') will be removed and the remaining portion 45'x12' will be attached to the existing structure as shown on the diagram.”
193. Plaintiffs assert that normally an amendment to a permit was sufficient, however, for Plaintiffs, the CEO requested Plaintiffs file a new permit application for every amendment, and pay a new fee, which Plaintiffs did.
194. On July 5, 2012, CEO Ouellet posted a memo to his file. The memo stated that he received a call from Roger Collins regarding the Plaintiffs permits.
195. On July 5, 2012, CEO Ouellet arrived at Plaintiffs camp with the police. CEO Ouellet said that he had received a call that Plaintiffs were doing something in violation regarding our building permits. This was upsetting for Plaintiffs carpenters. CEO Ouellet took pictures and was satisfied that Plaintiffs were not in violation of the permits.
196. On August 20, 2012, a notice of hearing on an untimely Administrative Appeal (emphasis added) by David Rouleau for application and permits approved by CEO regarding lot 20.
197. On August 27, 2012, the Board of Appeals held a hearing concerning an administrative appeal by David Rouleau for vested permits granted to Plaintiffs by the CEO. The CEO Ouellet defended all of Plaintiffs permits as being legal.
198. On September 18, 2012, CEO Ouellet took pictures of the camp after construction was stopped for the season.
199. Although Plaintiffs were not required to submit a new septic plan by the CEO, on September 17, 2012, Plaintiffs had a new septic site plan designed by soil site evaluator with attached email to CEO Ouellet and James Jacobsen from the Subsurface Wastewater Unit in Augusta.
200. On March 15, 2013, Plaintiffs applied for another permit with drawings, for an expansion to the structure permitted on June 18, 2012, “[T]o expand existing camp to maximum allowed expansion.”
201. On April 8, 2013, Plaintiffs received a letter from CEO Ouellet stating, “[I] am in receipt of a land-use application dated March 15, 2013. This application is requesting on expansion to the structure that was permitted on June 18, 2012.” Permit granted. Plaintiffs noted incredulously how simple it was to have their permit approved by the CEO compared to past permit applications in 2006.
202. On May 19, 2013, Plaintiffs began to remove all parts of the old camp that could not possibly meet the Town newly adopted (emphasis added) State Mubec and Town building codes.
203. Because, inter alia Plaintiffs decided to file a Special Motion to Dismiss after the Town issued Count II (approved by J. Hunter) in the RV violation, and after years of differential treatment by the Town; on May 28, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Petition to Secede all properties from the town of Madawaska. (emphasis Added)
204. On May 30, 2013, 43 hours (emphasis added) after Plaintiff filed a petition to secede all their properties from the Town, Plaintiffs observed CEO Ouellet willfully and fraudulently, caught on Plaintiffs security cameras taking pictures of the new camp expansions. The Town acknowledged this was the start of the enforcement action for the building violation.
205. On June 4, 2013, CEO Ouellet willfully and fraudulently sent Plaintiffs a Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order and added, “[T]his SWO is in force until the Board of Select People meet to discuss this matter.” Plaintiffs assert a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; with Attorney's fees pursuant to U.S.C.§1988 because Plaintiffs permits were vested which required an injunction to be filed pursuant to the Town SZO §16(I)(3) in order to prevent the Plaintiffs from continuing work on their camp.
206. Plaintiffs assert the Stop Work Order was illegal because the 30-day appeal period was past. In Wright v. Town of Kennebunkport, 1998 ME 184, note 8, 715 A.2d 162, 165. Frank Juliano, SR v. Town of Poland 1999 Docket: And-98-348, the Maine Supreme court adds, “[T]he stop work order was issued nearly two years after the permit was granted and was not timely due to the thirty-day appeal period specified in the ordinance. We have noted that “[s]trict compliance with the appeal procedure of an ordinance is necessary to ensure that once an individual obtains a building permit, he can rely on that permit with confidence that it will not be revoked after he has commenced construction.” It is for this, and inter alia, Plaintiffs invoke 42 U.S.C. §1983; with Attorney's fees pursuant to U.S.C.§1988.
207. CEO Ouellet willfully failed to follow the requirements as explained in the SZO pursuant to §16.I Enforcement: DEP Stephenie Maclagan instructed CEO Ouellet to indicate the corrective actions required for Mr. Cayer to regain compliance with the ordinance by stating, “[P]lease issue a notice of violation as soon as possible.” CEO Ouellet willfully ignored this request by DEP Stephenie M. and instituted a fraudulent act by issuing the notice of violation and stop work order without providing Plaintiffs the proper information as required by §16 I(2)(a).
208. Moreover, because CEO Ouellet willfully claimed Plaintiffs to be in violation of SZO §12 C (3), Plaintiffs defended themselves by asserting their right to have the Planning Board also be part of this determination as clearly stated in the SZO. §12 C(3) reads: “[I]f it is determined by the Code Enforcement Officer and Planning Board members that it is more than 50% based on current market value and the applicant disputes it, then he/she needs to submit an insurance or professional appraisal.”
209. Town Manager C. Therrein, and CEO Ouellet were willfully and vehemently opposed to allow the Planning Board determination if more than 50% was removed as stated in the Madawaska SZO. The Selectboard did approve to allow the Planning Board review a determination of more than 50% removal.
210. Plaintiffs believed that the reason the Town Manager and CEO were so vehemently opposed to allowing the Planning Board to determine if more than 50% of the value of the building had been removed was because; if the Planning Board agreed with the Plaintiffs, they would not have a legal argument to allege a code violation against Plaintiffs pursuant to §12 C(3).
211. It is important to note that after Plaintiffs filed the petition to secede from the town on or about May 28, 2013 the Chairperson Don Chasse, who's Board cited Plaintiffs for the RV violation resigned immediately and Vince Frallicciardi became Chairperson. Plaintiffs understood that Frallicciardi had allegedly embezzled $15,000 from Plaintiffs sister, which she had the FBI investigate.
212. Another reason Plaintiffs distrusted Frallicciardi was that to their knowledge, Frallicciardi personally told Plaintiffs sister that he had been dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Marine Corps for stealing military equipment, served 18 months in military prison, and was a convicted felon for those crimes.
213. On June 15, 2013, Plaintiffs met with the Selectboard Chairperson Vince Frallicciardi and Selectboard member David Morin to discuss and explain that we were not in violation and that §12 C(3) did not apply to the alleged building violations because there was no violation, Plaintiffs had legal vested permits, and the appeal period was past.
214. On June 22, 2013, Plaintiffs met again with the same two Board members to discuss the building violations. It was said by both Board members to both Plaintiffs, Richard and Ann Cayer, at both of these meetings, “[I]f you drop the secession claim, we will help you with the building violation.”
215. It is important to note on June 22, 2013 when Plaintiffs met with the same two Board members to discuss the building violations, the two Selectmen knew the Town Selectboard had willfully taken legal actions against Plaintiffs secession petition by contacting the Maine Municipal Association (MMA), and our State Representative Ken Theriault, to willfully and fraudulently amend the secession statute without Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's knowledge. It is also a fact, that the Town Manager Christina Therrien willfully took steps to make sure Plaintiffs did not know what she was doing with MMA and the Maine Legislature. Plaintiffs assert this willful fraud in the inducement, violated Plaintiffs Constitutional right to petition Government.
216. Plaintiffs believe that the willful secret conspiratorial action by the Town, MMA, and the Maine Legislature, - a legal association sworn to defend the Law - perpetrated extrinsic fraud, willfully violated Plaintiffs rights, and violated their oath of office by amending a State Statute without Plaintiffs knowledge, in secret, fraudulently claiming an emergency amendment, willfully, without any public notice, in violation of Maine Legislative Rules, and in clandestine meetings.
217. Within 3 weeks on July 1, 2013, (emphasis added) the Maine Legislature, willfully committed extrinsic fraud, in violation of their own rules requiring a public notice in newspapers, acting in a conspiracy with MMA, the Town, in clandestine hearings and meetings, fraudulently, and willfully, passed an “Emergency Amendment” bill preventing Plaintiffs from continuing with their petition without the Maine Legislature's authorization. Because this bill amended the secession State statute without any notice (in violation of Maine Law), and completely in secret, Plaintiffs were denied an opportunity to be heard before the Maine Legislature. However, the Town and MMA were present and were allowed to be heard by the Maine Legislature in these clandestine Hearings and meetings. Plaintiffs assert this was a violation of their Constitutional rights to petition and partake in governmental lawmaking process and procedures, denying them the right to take part in amending a State statute that directly affected them. This was also a violation of State Legislative Rules.
218. Plaintiffs believe this willful clandestine act by the Maine Legislature, MMA, the Town, Representative Ken Therriault, and Town Manager Christinna Therrien, caused extrinsic fraud, violating, inter alia, Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights of State Legislative Rules, and the right to petition government for secession pursuant to: The United States Constitution, and the Constitution of the State of Maine. Article I Section 2 Power Inherent in People.
219. §2171. Legislative intent: The Legislature finds that the citizens of the State in accordance with the Constitution of Maine, Article I, Section 2, have an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government and to alter, reform or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it. The Legislature further finds that the Legislature has the responsibility to ensure that the rights of all citizens are protected and that a decision to alter or otherwise change the boundaries of a municipal government should be made with caution and only after following the process set forth in this subchapter. [1999, c. 381, §1 (AMD).]
220. Plaintiffs assert this extrinsic fraud by the Town, MMA, the Maine Legislature, Representative Ken Therriault, and Town Manager Christina Therrien constitute a willful conspiracy intended to prevent Plaintiffs from exercising their Constitutional Right to secede from the municipality.
221. Plaintiffs objected to Justice Hunter's reasons for his decision in the civil action to secede from the Town of Madawaska. Inter Alia, especially the claim that “[T]he Town has no obligation to apprise the citizenry at large about its efforts to further State legislation.” Plaintiffs assert that the Town does not have the right to conspire with MMA, the State legislature, State Representative, and the Selectpersons to circumvent Maine Law and Maine Legislative Rules that shall provide for a “Notice” of bills to be presented to the Maine State legislature. Simply put, the Maine Legislature MUST publish a Notice of the bills to be voted on 6 months in advance of Hearings or in the alternative the Maine Legislature MUST publish a Notice of the bills to be voted on, and cannot amend State law in secret clandestine meeting and Hearings.
222. Furthermore, Plaintiffs vehemently object to Justice Hunter's claim that “[P]laintiffs do not succeed in arguing that the Town's surreptitious Lobbying deprived them of the right to participate in the legislative process (couched as a violation of their right to free speech or right to petition.” First, the definition of surreptitious is, “[k]ept secret, especially because it would not be approved of.” The citizens of Madawaska and the State of Maine do have a right to know when, and what, or which State Statute the Maine Legislature is amending. Plaintiffs also have a right to know what the Town is doing whenever it is conducting clandestine meetings. There was no public discussion or vote taken at any Board meeting on Therrien's conspiracy with MMA, Representative Therriault, and the State Legislation, to secretly amend a statute in violation of a citizen's rights under the U.S. Constitution, and the Maine Constitution, especially if “it would not be approved of.” In fact, video of the July Selectpersons meeting clearly show Therrein willfully concealed by extrinsic fraud, her actions with the Maine Legislature, as she had done in many previous meetings.
223. The willful violations of Plaintiffs rights by the Town manager, and Chairperson Vince Frallicciardi, a convicted felon, inter alia, refusal to act, pursuant to the secession statute, caused irreparable harm to Plaintiffs secession petition.
224. On June 27, 2013, the Selectboard voted to allow the Planning Board to determine if more than 50% of the value of the structure had been removed as provided in the town SZO. The CEO and the Town Manager were vehemently opposed to this. After the Board voted to send this matter to the Planning Board Plaintiffs were told by two Selectmen that the Town manager and CEO were so angry with the Board that they would not talk to them for a period of time and another Selectman resigned.
225. On July 9, 2013, the Planning Board did meet to discuss this matter, however, the agenda for the Planning Board was willfully obfuscated by the CEO, “[T]o review and decide an Interpretation and Jurisdiction of the Planning Board of the Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance regarding Section 12-Non-Compliance Subsection C, non-Conforming Structures #3-Reconstruction or Replacement-as it relates to determining the less than or more than 50% market value of the structure.”
226. There is no Section 12 Non-Compliance. Plaintiffs believe because the Town Manager and CEO did not want to bring this matter before the Planning Board, they willfully obfuscated this article for the Planning Board to review, which confused them to the point that after 2 hours of discussion in two separate meetings, they were still asking themselves what they were there to decide.
227. Unknown to Plaintiffs, CEO Ouellet had provided the Planning Board with a package of information about his interpretation of the history of Plaintiffs permitting process including a “memo to Planning Board regarding the July 9th meeting. In the memo from CEO Ouellet to the Planning Board was a copy of an email dated Wednesday June 19, 2013 from DEP to CEO Ouellet in regards to CEO Ouellet's fraudulent question in his email on June 18, 2013. '[I]f less than 50% was removed, should we now see a new portion being added to the old portion which is greater than 50%?” Plaintiffs question the CEO's intent of Greater than 50% of what?
228. DEP Stephenie MacLagan responded with this willful, fraudulent statement, on June 19, 2013 “[Y]ou're correct, regardless of cause, when more than 50% of the market value of the structure is removed within an 18-month period, then in order to reconstruct, the applicant has to get Planning Board approval. The language in the SZO is clear. “[A]ny non-conforming structures.... which is removed or destroyed by more than 50% of the market value of the structure before such damage, destruction, .... may be reconstructed or replaced provided that a permit is obtained within eighteen (18) months of the date of said damage, destruction,”
229. Plaintiffs believe this willful fraudulent statement by DEP Stephenie MacLagan was intended to set up the next statement from DEP S.MacLagan. “[T]hat process requires the Planning Board to review where the ORIGINAL STRUCTURE could be relocated to meet the setback to the greatest practical extent.” S. MacLagan goes on to say “[W]e have a record that they did this and so that is where the entire structure would have to be reconstructed and any expansion would have to be outside the shoreland setback.” This willful false statement by S. MacLagan is referring to the May 10, 2012, Planning Board meeting where Jeff Albert motioned to table the permit application “[u]ntil Mr. Cayer can present to the Planning Board a valid septic plan for the lot.” The motion to table the application was unanimous. Therefore, the town does not have a record “[t]hat they did this.”
230. The determination for the GPE from the HW line had been determined by the Planning Board on August 25, 2008.
231. Plaintiffs claim that DEP Stephenie MacLagan was willfully misleading the Planning Board based on another alleged code violation that was in Superior Court at the time as the RV violation in which both CEO Ouellet and DEP Stephenie M. conspired to obfuscate the facts, as in this instant case, to punish Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs complained to her superiors in Augusta about her biased performance in carrying out her duties at DEP. Plaintiff verified with Colin Clark, her past supervisor, that Stephenie MacLagan is no longer working for DEP.
232. During the July 9, 2013 discussion by the Planning Board, Vince Vanier asked, “[M]r. Cayer is it your opinion that what you have on your lot right now is worth more than $4,000?” Plaintiff R. Cayer responded “yes, it is worth much more than that”. He then asked the CEO Ouellet, “[B]ob is it your opinion that the structure that is sitting on the lot presently is worth more than $4,000?” CEO Ouellet replied “[O]h, there is no doubt that it is but, it came...It came through the back door, he came to me for an application for less than 50% remove. Okay there is more than one way to get to the finish line here.”
233. Planning Board member, V. Vanier, said “[T]hey are both in agreement that what is sitting there now is more value than what the existing trailer was. They're both in agreement, we don't even have to be here.” [audio recording location (1:34:42)]
234. Chairman Vince Sirois “can you put that in a sentence ha ha (laugh) in the form of a motion?” Vince replied, “I'll I'll make a motion” ..CEO Ouellet interrupts the motion “you know the way I'm looking at it is a roundabout way” …..Vince Vanier said, “I know it's a very complex issue.” CEO Ouellet, “right, the fact that I agree with that's what's there today yeh..just like everyone will agree that your shirt is purple today but if you came to me the other day with blue, well where is your blue shirt? Okay. Where is your blue shirt?”
235. It is important to note that when asked by Planning Board member Vince Vanier, “[B]ob is it your opinion that the structure that is sitting on the lot presently is worth $4,000?” CEO Ouellet replied “Oh, there is no doubt that it is “. And his other statement a few minutes later, “right, the fact that I agree with that's what's there today, yeh. ” CEO Ouellet admitted that his claiming that Plaintiffs had removed more than 50% of the structure, was false.
236. At the July 9, 2013 Planning Board meeting, there was discussion about the value of the trailer camp before Plaintiff started the expansion including discussion of the town evaluation for $2,000 by Randy Tarr (Tax Assessor). Plaintiff also explained to the Board that Mr. Tarr told him that the camp was not worth anything and the reason for the $2,000 tax assessed value was because the location of the structure was grandfathered. For that reason, the tax assessor added “encourage removal” of the camp on the tax map, because it had no market value other than its grandfathered location.
237. After more than two (2) hours (in two (2) separate (2) hour Planning Board hearings) (4 hrs. total) into the Planning Board meeting, (location 2:00:00 of the audio recording) the Chairperson Vince Sirois said “do we eh. Are we saying eh. We have to make a decision to ehh. The only thing that we have to say here is that do we agree with Bob's decision or do we.... On this 50% market value here.” Now, the Chairperson re-reads the Article 4. once again “to interpretation and Jurisdiction of the Planning Board “...Jeff Albert says: “We have to decide, we have to try to make a decision in our opinion, did he remove more than 50% of the market value of the structure.” Chairperson Vince, “no it has nothing to do with Mr. Cayer, this article 4 has just a word in this book it has nothing to do with the landowner, it doesn't mention Mr. Cayer in here.” CEO Ouellet said, “Vince, I gata go - just make a decision”. Chairperson Vince Sirois “yup, if you read this article all we're trying to do here is to try to agree with eh...do you agree with that Jeff? Jeff, “what? Vince, “With what the article is saying”. Jeff, in French “ahhh ban la, ehhh non.. non...ehh..the ordinance is saying eh.. the ordinance ….is the ordinance okay....” Vince, “so what's our, what's our, what's our, decision based on article 4...What's our decision based” Jeff, “does it have to be based on did he take out, did he remove more than 50% of the market value, okay did he remove more than 50% or did he remove more than 50% of the market value of that structure. Okay, that's it, that’s all we have. Okay? Vince, “the landowner's name is not on this article.” Jeff, “it doesn't matterrrrrr. That's why we're hererrrrr. It's that structurerrrrr.” Vince, “laughs ha ha, okay, okay, somebody, somebody make a decision, somebody make a motion and somebody second it and,” Jeff, “That's what we're here for right,”. Jeff, “that's all we're hererrrr for right?” Vince, “if we need to table it we can ….where's my ehh ...where's my ...pause... as chairman I can table this until next time or do we want to make a decision” Jeff, “do as you like, we have Board members here now and we can make a decision here or not. I mean it's an opinion.” Chairman Vince, “hum hum,” Jeff “it's ..it's an opinion I, I mean it's an opinion you know we can make an opinion and Mr. Cayer agrees or doesn't agree he can take the next step, it’s as simple as that..and it's the same as Bob, if Bob doesn't agree if we say he took out less than 50% and he thinks there's still a violation pursue it, by all means let him pursue it, that's it right? That's it...right.” Vince, “laugh ha ha” Jeff, “whoever is there pursue it. We’re not judging Bob, we're not judging Bick, Inaudible Laughter from the Planning Board members. Jeff, “I'm going to put forward a motion that says, he took out more than 50% or he took out less than 50% it's one or the other, that's all that's being asked of us here...pause. Vince, exactly right, Jeff, “exactly right, it's not for us to decide there's case laws there are other issues the other issues that he has vested rights, maybe he does maybe he doesn't I don't know that, I really don't, if he believes he does he has every right to believe that, okay, (Laughter,) he has every right. Okay, and is there a violation there, is he trying to break,, get around the regulations and all that maybe he is.... maybe he's not ...I'm not going to decide that anyway. (Background talk), your right, I think your right, okay,,” Vince, “we've been provided evidence that we need to determine this.” Vince Vanier, “we've been provided some evidence but we weren't provided with the actual market value of what's there” Jeff, “no because we have to disagree with Mr. Cayer first for him to go get an appraisal. He doesn't have to otherwise.”
238. It is important to note that the CEO Ouellet left half way through this meeting.
239. “ Vince Vanier said even after his previous statements, “Okay I guess I'll do it eh..I'll make the eh I'll make the motion that determines that Mr. Cayer that Mr. and Mrs. Cayer have removed more than 50% of the market value of the Property on that lot” Tom Schneck “I'll second that”. Jeff, “your saying that he removed more than 50% of the market value of that structure is that... inaudible.... umm” Chairperson Vince Sirois says, “and Tom seconds it... is there anymore discussion, all in favor? Inaudible noise ...pause Recording location: (02:05:06) Article 5....
240. Plaintiffs assert the Planning Board members at these meetings willfully obfuscated the simple issue of the value of the camp at that time, and fraudulently caused Plaintiffs great harm financially, and emotionally.
241. In 2013, Plaintiffs received their tax bill from the Town of Madawaska for the camp on that lot. The assessment by the Town for the camp as of 2013, in now worth $6,000. A 300% increase from before Plaintiffs expanded in 2012 which was $2,000.
242. On July 19, 2013, Plaintiffs appraisal confirmed that the market value of the expanded camp was now worth $27,500.
243. Enclosed is a handwritten Fax dated 7/23/13 to Stephenie Maclagan (DEP) contradicting his statements at the July 9, 2013 Planning Board meeting that the structure was worth more than $4,000 including many false statements in his usual obfuscated way. CEO Ouellet claims “[I] look at it as being in violation of the 1st permit”. However, he does not identify the violation.
244. On July 29, 2013, CEO Ouellet sent Plaintiffs a letter concerning the Planning Board decision of July 9, 2013. His letter tells about how the Planning Board met at Plaintiffs request “[t]o discuss the issue of 50% of market value of the structure.” “After much deliberation, the Planning Board motioned that more than 50% of the market value of the existing structure had been removed.” CEO Ouellet now is stating “the Planning Board motioned that more than 50% of the market value of the existing structure had been removed.” He also explains that he is setting up another meeting with the Planning Board to review our appraisal.
245. There are no provisions in our town code requiring Planning Board meetings to review the licensed Appraisal. They (Planning Board) certainly proved how incompetent they were in determining the 50% at the July 9, 2013 Planning Board meeting. Plaintiffs question why would we need the Planning Board to review a Professional Appraisal?
246. According to the Madawaska SZO on page 7. (3) “if it is determined by the Code Enforcement Officer and Planning Board members that more than 50% based on current market value and the applicant disputes it, then he/she needs to submit an insurance or professional appraisal.” This Professional Appraisal is the last step in determining the value of the structure before and after removal. At this point, the CEO was proven wrong, alleging that Plaintiffs had removed more than 50% of the market value of the structure before they removed the last remaining part of the old camp and should have removed the SWO and allowed Plaintiffs to continue with their construction.
247. At the August 12, 2013 Planning Board meeting, the agenda was “to Review Richard and Ann Cayer's appraisal regarding Market Value of the existing Structures”. The Planning Board willfully refused to review the appraisal; but instead fraudulently discussed another ex-parte letter from DEP Stephenie Maclagan dated August 9, 2013.
248. Although every Planning Board member had a copy of a letter dated August 9, 2013 by DEP Stephenie Maclagan, Plaintiffs had not seen a copy and were unaware of such a letter and what they were discussing. After discussion about the DEP letter by the Planning Board, Planning Board member Jeff Albert commented that according to the DEP letter by Stephenie Maclagan, the decision about the more or less than 50% must be made from the original structure because according to Jeff Albert that was what the letter said. Plaintiffs made clear that the Planning Board was supposed to acknowledge the appraisal and not another DEP letter from S. Maclagan.
249. Plaintiffs made clear that they opposed the fact that the Planning Board members were willfully reviewing a letter that Plaintiffs had no knowledge of. Plaintiffs believed that this action by the town was willful extrinsic fraud. Once again, the Planning Board was reviewing information provided by CEO Ouellet that put Plaintiffs at a severe disadvantage because Plaintiffs did not know what they were talking about and this was ex-parte communications, and a willful violation of Plaintiffs' rights of due process and equal protection inter alia because the Board was only required to discuss the appraisal.
250. Plaintiffs asked for a copy and after quickly reviewing the letter, Plaintiffs told the Board that nowhere in the letter by Stephenie Maclagan did it say that the decision about the 50% removal must be based from the original structure.
251. Jeff Albert replied “[t]hat's how I interpret it, Yeh that's very apparent in that letter.”
252. Audio recording (12:40:00) Jeff Albert willfully said, “well listen, in the code it is very plain, we were to determine the eh.... the market value and what was removed. And I personally.... I'm inclined to agree with the Cayer's.... it's the structure. However, however, that is not the guidance from DEP, not the guidance from DEP, they only look at the original structure. We all agree 100% was removed there is no argument that the trailer that was there is gone... it all depends on how DEP looks at it.... DEP is telling us to look at only the original structure.”
253. Plaintiffs asked the Planning Board members if they were going to review our appraisal and who was going to pay for that appraisal.
254. The response from Jeff Albert's willful statement was, “[N]o, and you will need it for court.” Plaintiffs assert Jeff Albert had not been an active Planning Board member for many years and had participated only in Plaintiffs cases, at times without being sworn in. Plaintiffs later found out that Jeff Albert had a business agreement with the Chairperson of the Selectboard Vince Frallicciardi, transporting military equipment, some of which was illegally purchased and sold.
255. Because Plaintiff Richard Cayer knew Chairperson Frallicciardi was a convicted felon, he had been investigating Chairman Vince Frallicciardi for some time concerning the use of his position as Chairman to buy military equipment. Moreover, Plaintiff Cayer was one of very few who knew Vince Frallicciardi had been dishonorably discharged from the military for stealing military equipment and had been in military prison for 18 months for those thefts.
256. Chairperson Frallicciardi owns and operates a salvage business in Madawaska. After he became Chairperson, he secured a $10,000 transportation account paid by the Town, to be used to buy and transport military equipment bought at auction. Jeff Albert owns a trucking company that had an agreement with Chairperson Frallicciardi to transport this military equipment.
257. Plaintiff Cayer questioned this fact at a Town Meeting by saying, “[I] want to have all information in regards to buying and selling of military equipment because I don't want to wake up some morning and find out that the Town is in the salvage business with Vince Frallicciardi.” Chairperson Frallicciardi was visibly upset and firmly said at this public Town Meeting, “[I]f you think that I am lining my pockets with this military equipment, come to the Town office and I will give you all the paperwork.
258. Shortly after at the town office, Plaintiff asked Chairperson Frallicciardi for this information. Chairperson Frallicciardi attacked Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer by yelling and threatening them so violently the town clerk called the police.
259. Plaintiffs filed a Protective Order in District Court which was denied, partly because Chairperson Frallicciardi lied on the stand about the threats to Plaintiffs.
260. Plaintiffs Richard and Ann followed up with acting Town Manager Ross Dubois who is the Chief of Police today, requesting all information in regards to this $10,000. transportation account because Plaintiffs understood that chairperson Frallicciardi now had a military bulldozer at his gravel pit in Sinclair, ME. Plaintiffs received only two (2) sheets of paperwork with little or no information.
261. Plaintiffs were also investigating another matter that was being secretly discussed by the Board of Selectpersons in executive session. Plaintiffs were having a hard time to get the information. It was later found out that the Chairperson Vince Frallicciardi had bought guns from the Madawaska Police department which proved to be a violation of Law because Chairperson Frallicciardi was a convicted felon.
262. Chairperson Vince Frallicciardi resigned from the Board of Selectpersons shortly after.
263. Because Plaintiffs proved without any doubt that they had not removed more than 50% of the market value of the structure before they removed it, that should have been the end of the CEO's fraudulent claim by the CEO, pursuant to §12.C(3). Moreover, the real reason Plaintiffs were not in violation of the SZO was because the permits were vested, not §12.C(3).
264. On August 22, 2013, the CEO notified Plaintiffs (the Cayers) that the Board of Selectpeople would consider the building violation on September 3, 2013.
265. Also, in the August 22, 2013 letter, the CEO notified Plaintiffs “The Stop Work Order remains in effect until there is a resolution in this matter.” Plaintiffs also assert the SWO was illegal and violated Plaintiffs rights because the permits were vested and, there are no provisions in the Madawaska code books for a stop work order.
266. Plaintiffs explained to Chairman Vince Frallicciardi that they needed more time to prepare their defense before meeting with the Selectpersons. The chairperson told Plaintiffs to put the concerns and reasons in writing and that it would be decided at the meeting whether to postpone or not. Plaintiffs responded with a letter dated September 2, 2013, requesting to postpone the meeting alleging a variety of grievances including bias by Board members. The Board willfully violated Plaintiffs rights when it did not read the letter with the request, and denied a postponement. The Selectpersons willfully denied Plaintiffs the right to defend themselves and to bring their concerns including the appraisal. The Board decided to pursue the matter with a fine and Consent Agreement as detailed in DEP Stephenie's letter based on false information.
267. Plaintiffs letter of September 2, 2013 to the Selectboard complained of bias among many other personal issues concerning Selectboard members Brenda Theriault and Barbra Skinner. According to the Town of Madawaska September 3, 2013 Selectperson meeting (which we had not attended), the first question before the Board was as Chairman Frallicciardi stated, “[t]he Board can decide to carry forward with the violation or push the meeting so Mr. Cayer can be present.” Selectperson Theriault willfully stated, there is no point in waiting, there is a code violation. Selectperson Skinner willfully agreed with Selectperson Theriault. A motion was willfully made by Selectperson Skinner to move ahead with the code violation for Mr. Richard Cayer; and willfully seconded by Selectperson Theriault. Chairperson Frallicciardi, Selectperson Skinner, and Selectperson Theriault were in favor of the motion. Motion Carried. (a) They willfully denied Plaintiffs the right to defend themselves. Plaintiffs claim this act by the Board was willful extrinsic fraud. (b) Ex-parte communication – request time for more information denied.
268. The Board willfully voted against allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to be present, and to claim concerns in the letter of, inter alia, bias by Selectperson Brenda Theriault and Barbra Skinner.
269. The Board's vote to deny Plaintiffs their Due Process right to provide the Board members the professional appraisal, which was the next step of the SZO§12C. (3) process. Plaintiffs were ready to provide the Board members exculpatory evidence that §12C (3) did not apply as charged by the CEO Ouellet because Plaintiffs increased the value of the camp by 300%.
270. A motion was made by Selectperson Skinner to offer Mr. Cayer a Consent Agreement and he will have to go back to the Planning Board......second by Selectperson Theriault.
271. Plaintiffs believe this willful procedural due process violation resulted in the meritless code violation and illegal stop work order by the Town of Madawaska. For this reason, Plaintiffs claim the Town willfully violated Plaintiffs Constitutional rights of equal protection, and procedural due process rights, pursuant to 42 §§ 1983 and 1988.
272. On August 27, 2013, DEP Stephenie Maclagan wrote a letter to the Selectboard again filled with many willful fraudulent statements. She starts the second paragraph by stating, “[I’] v been asked to clarify that an expansion is not possible if the nonconforming structure being expanded does not exist.” Plaintiffs facts make clear the nonconforming structure (the camp) was never removed and was worth over $27,500 with the new expansion. DEP Stephenie M. was told willfully by CEO Ouellet in the June 18, 2013 email many false statements inter alia, “[D]uring the month of May, I happened to drive by the work site and noticed that the structure was gone and all that remained was the steel frame work and the wall.”
273. Plaintiffs assert the letter of August 09, 2013 by DEP Stephenie M. was willful extrinsic fraud requested by the Town CEO to support the CEO's claim for a violation of §12C (3) which was used willfully by both, the Planning Board, and the Select Board to justify the CEO's charge that Plaintiffs had violated the Madawaska SZO.
274. The Dismissal with Prejudice by the Town provides exculpatory evidence, that there was no violation.
275. Based on these undisputable facts, Plaintiffs' have had to endure years of harassment, decimation, and great financial loss defending meritless lawsuits, appeals, and petition to secede, against the Town of Madawaska's Board of Selectpersons, Town Manager Therrian, CEO Ouellet, Planning Board, and Board of Appeals members. The willful irreparable harm done to Plaintiffs reputation is ongoing.
276. The town has willfully claimed that Plaintiffs removed more than 50% of the market value of the camp, before removal. Plaintiffs removed the old portion of the newly expanded camp. According to the town, this portion was worth $2,000 before it was removed the part of the camp that did not meet today’s code according to §12B (2). The town tax assessment shows that the newly expanded camp is worth $6,000. CEO Ouellet said in the July 9, 2013 Planning Board meeting that it was worth more than $4,000; and our appraisal, by a licensed appraiser, appraised it at $27,500.
277. The Madawaska SZO is clear, “[I]f it is determined by the CEO and Planning Board members that it is more than 50% based on current market value and the applicant disputes it, then he/she needs to submit an insurance or professional appraisal.
278. After two (2) very lengthy and difficult Planning Board hearings where the CEO agreed the value to be more than $4,000. (twice its original value), and with a licensed professional appraisal for a value of $27,500, the Planning Board, CEO, and Board of Selectpersons willfully refused to even consider looking at Plaintiffs information as outlined in the town SZO.
279. On September 3, 2013, after all of the false claims made by CEO Ouellet about the removal of more than 50% of the structure, the Town of Madawaska's Board of Selectpersons denied Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer the right to defend themselves before the Board of Selectpersons with their appraisal. Because the appraisal vindicated Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer, CEO Ouellet, and the Board of Selectpersons now made other false claims based on DEP Stephenie MacLagan's letter falsely claiming that “[Y]ou cannot expand a structure that does not exist.”
280. It is important to note the two Selectpersons, Brenda Theriault and Barbra Skinner, of the Board of Selectpersons who made and seconded the motions to deny Plaintiffs the right to postpone the meeting and found a violation existed that warranted legal action, were the two Board members Plaintiffs Richard and Ann claimed to be biased against them.
281. Plaintiffs tax card has comments from the tax assessor, where he “encourages removal” of the camp. He, (Randy Tarr, tax assessor) also added a comment about the 1952 camp as “very poor” Physical Value (sv) sound value $2,000.
282. As Plaintiffs worked in the newly expanded building, Plaintiffs were obligated to remove, replace, and rebuild all expansions in accordance with §12 B (2). The only thing that could be salvaged was the new electrical entrance that Plaintiff had installed a few years before. There was no other electrical, plumbing, egress windows, (2 inch) walls, (3 inch) roof, (2 inch) insulation, (4 inch) floors, or any other part of this camp especially with the mold, rot, and rust that Plaintiff discovered all over that conformed to federal, state, or local building and safety codes. Because the building permits issued by CEO Ouellet required Plaintiff to construct, expand, remove, and replace everything in accordance to §12 B(2) Repair and Maintenance: anything less would have been a clear violation of our permits for expansion under the SZO, §12 C (1) Expansion: A nonconforming structure may be added to or expanded after obtaining a permit from the same permitting authority as that for a new structure, if such addition or expansion does not increase the non-conformity of the structure, and comply with all other municipal ordinances, and is in accordance with subparagraph (a), and (b) below.
283. CEO Ouellet knew exactly what Plaintiffs intended to do. He reviewed Plaintiffs' application, added and modified Plaintiffs' drawings, and issued the permits with clear and specific conditions for height of building, dye testing of septic system, and side yard distances. However, there was no mention or discussions of §12 C (3) or removing more or less than 50% of the structure as claimed by the Town and its Attorneys. CEO Ouellet understood that he could require these conditions such as the ones he put on our permits concerning the setbacks, dye testing the septic, or not to exceed onto the side yard distance “by a drip edge”. However, he chose not to discuss, mention, or even add as conditions in writing, about §12C(3) that he sometimes interprets to be for the “original building” rather than “by more than 50% of the market value of the structure before such damage destruction or removal” as is clearly stated in the SZO pursuant to §12 C(3). He also could have simply refused the permit application and if we did not agree with his conditions, we could have, and would have appealed his decision to the Board of Appeals, or Superior Court as was necessary in the past. In our opinion, it is painfully clear to us now that CEO Ouellet had always intended to grant us the permits, let us expand, and when we removed the parts of the old camp that we could not repair or comply with page 4 §12B (2) of the SZO, he would act as he did with a STOP WORK ORDER and citation. In other words, he granted the permits willfully “in Bad Faith” with the intention of revoking the permits, or stopping the work at some time after Plaintiffs started to build.
284. On April 15, 2014, 9 months after the notice of violation (NOV), the town filed a code violation on Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer.
285. On June 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Special Motion to Dismiss in Superior court docket CARSC-CV-2014-082 because Plaintiffs clearly understood the charges against Plaintiffs were meritless because the permits were vested.
286. On July 10, 2014, Town Manager Christina Therrien and CEO Bob Ouellet willfully filed fraudulent affidavits. Because of the significant importance (material facts) and the number of the willful false statements on CEO Ouellet's and Town manager Therrien's affidavits, on or about July 17, 2014, Plaintiff Richard Cayer filed a Response to Robert Ouellet affidavit/affidavit of Richard Cayer.
287. Number 10 of CEO Ouellet's affidavit willfully made the false statement under oath when he claimed, “[O]n May 10, 2012, the Town's Planning Board, after being addressed by Richard and Ann, approved Richard and Ann's April 30, 2012 land use permit application with conditions which included installation of a new septic system.” This was a willful and fraudulent statement of a material fact which CEO Ouellet used to justify the notice of violation and to convince DEP Stephenie Maclagan to support the CEO's meritless lawsuit against Plaintiffs.
288. In the Town Manager's affidavit, Christina Therrien claims the exact same willful fraudulent claim as CEO Ouellet “[O]n May 10, 2012, the Town's Planning Board, after being addressed by Richard and Ann, approved Richard and Ann's April 30, 2012 land use permit application with conditions which included installation of a new septic system.”
289. The Town's minutes of the May 10, 2012, Planning Board meeting, show Jeff Albert “[M]ove to table the Cayer request as noted in Article 4 and wait until Mr. Cayer can present to the Planning Board a valid septic plan for the lot;” seconded by V. Sirois. Motion Carried. The matter was tabled and never brought up again. Jeff Albert was not “sworn in” as a Planning Board member, and had not been active as a Planning Board member since 2006.
290. Number 11 of the CEO's affidavit continues with more willful fraudulent statements; “[T]o my information and belief, Richard and Ann did not seek an administrative appeal of the Town Planning Board decision of May 10, 2012. Also, to my information and belief, Richard and Ann did not seek judicial review of the Town Planning Board decision of May 10, 2012.” Because the issue was tabled at the May 10, 2012 Planning Board meeting at the Cayer's request, there could be no appeal and CEO Ouellet knew this.
291. CEO Ouellet willfully made other false claims in his affidavit such as, “[O]n May 22, 2012, I received from Richard and Ann a land use permit application to remove less than fifty (50%) percent of an existing structure on their lot, and to add an addition to an existing structure on their lot which meets the requirements of the Town's SZO. After reviewing their land use permit application, I granted it on May 29, 2012 with conditions.” CEO Ouellet and Town Manager Christina Therrien also repeated these false statements about the permits being issued for “less than 50% removal, and under §12 C (3) to justify the meritless code violations.
292. Harold Pelletier (a neighbor) told Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer that CEO Ouellet told him that he could remove his old camp and built a new home only to find that after the old camp had been removed CEO Ouellet refused to allow him to build at that same location. For this and many other reasons, Plaintiff did not trust CEO Ouellet and was careful not to make the same mistake and made sure not to remove more than 50% of the market value of the structure, before removing it. In 2012, the Chairperson of the Planning Board Vince Sirois asked Plaintiff Richard why he did not remove the camp after their approval at the August 25, 2008 Planning Board meeting. Plaintiff told Chairperson Sirois, because he did not trust the CEO, Plaintiff would not do anything without the permit in hand, which he did not receive in 2008 even though the Planning Board had approved it. Although CEO Ouellet was required to issue the permit after the Planning Board approval, he continued to make more requests until Plaintiffs gave up for health and court actions later in the fall. It was only in 2012 when the CEO granted the permits did the Plaintiff begin to build and made sure to keep more than 50% of the market value of the structure ($2,000.) before removing it, although Plaintiff understood it to be legal to remove the old camp at any time.
293. On April 23, 2012, CEO Ouellet emailed DEP Stephenie Maclagan willfully claiming, “[D]oes this mean that if a person has a camp that has fallen in disrepair, no electricity connection from the power company, no propane cylinders installed, and no real landscape upkeep to the property in the last 5-6 years, that if the applicant wants to remove all structure, that he has lost his grandfathered status of, setback from normal high water line, 20% non-vegetation, and height requirement? Or does it mean that the Planning Board has to review the application for the best practical location, and follow the normal vegetation, setback, and height requirements, as though it was an empty lot. Let me know what you think.”
294. There are two important statements in this email. First, the CEO is making a claim that the camp may no longer be grandfathered because of issues claimed. Second, the CEO is asking “[I]f the applicant wants to remove all structures, that he has lost his grandfathered status of, ... and DEP S. Maclagan responds with, “[S]ince the existing structure is proposed to be replaced, the replacement must comply with the shoreline setback to the greatest practical.” Plaintiffs assert this is accomplished by applying §12 C(2), the very same provision for expansion pursuant to §12 C(1)(b) under Expansions that Plaintiffs had to meet in order to receive a permit. Moreover, the town assessor Randy Tarr had also “recommended removal” on the tax map because according to him “[t]he camp was not worth anything.”
295. After Plaintiffs expanded with vested permits and removed the old camp as required by §12 B(2) ---and because nothing in the old camp complied with the provisions of 12 B(2)----of the SZO. The CEO willfully issued the Stop Work Order and notice of violation even though there were no violations and the permits had vested.
296. On August 9, 2013, DEP MacLagan wrote the CEO and town a letter telling CEO Ouellet “[O]n June 4, 2013 you issued a notice of violation and stop work order. The letter did not indicate the corrective actions required for Mr. Cayer to regain compliance with the ordinance. Please issue a notice of violation as soon as possible. In addition to the nature of the violation stated in the 4 June letter, state what corrective action are necessary §16(I)(2)a,....”
297. Plaintiffs believe because CEO Ouellet willfully misled DEP Stephenie MacLagan about Plaintiffs permitting process, he willfully did not follow up as suggested by S. MacLagan with a new NOV and corrective action. Because CEO Ouellet did not follow up as suggested by S. MacLagan with a new NOV and corrective action, Plaintiffs Richard and Ann were willfully deprived of proper Notice of violation as outlined in the Madawaska SZO §16(I)(2) a.
298. Plaintiffs claim these omissions, inter alia, is a violation of Plaintiffs procedural Due process rights, willfully done in bad faith, to deny Plaintiffs the right to correct and defend themselves against the CEO's meritless lawsuit. Plaintiffs invoke 42 U.S.C. §1983; with Attorney's fees pursuant to U.S.C.§1988.
299. On or about June 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Dismiss the Amended Land Use Citation and Complaint pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 556 because Plaintiffs believed inter alia, the SWO was a violation of their Due Process rights, the notice of violation was meritless and was initiated 43 hours after Plaintiffs filed a Petition to Secede from the Town, and the Town wanted to punish Plaintiffs for their actions against the Town.
300. On or about July 20, 2014, Defendant filed opposition to Special Motion to Dismiss with affidavits from CEO Ouellet and Christina Therrien. Plaintiffs received the court schedule for the anti-SLAPP case to be on the March 26, 2015 docket, 9 months after Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Dismiss.
301. On July 21, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a reply to Opposition to Special Motion to Dismiss.
302. On December 22, 2014, defendants filed their reply to Supplemental Opposition to Special Motion to dismiss.
303. Plaintiffs assert there are no provisions in the Special Motion to Dismiss to allow defendant's filing of opposition to the anti-SLAPP statute. The statute is clear, “[T]he court shall (emphasis added) grant the special motion, unless the party whom the special motion is made shows that the ...and that the moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party.”
304. Plaintiffs assert that they most certainly met the Law Court two-step analysis that courts must follow to determine whether a Special Motion to Dismiss should be granted. First, the permits were vested, second, there was no violation, third, the SWO was illegal and violated Plaintiffs rights to due process of law, there was no hearing as claimed by the town, forth, the town started the complaint 43 hours after Plaintiffs filed a petition to secede. In other words, “this was such a case.” Undisputable evidence that the violation claims were meritless is provided with the Dismissal with Prejudice by the Town.
305. The Town, through its Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) willfully provided fraud on the Courts when the information provided to the courts claimed Plaintiffs were notified of the public “Hearing”, that the Board held a “Hearing” on September 3, 2013 and “[M]unicipalities suffer actual injury when their ordinances are not followed by their citizenry, because that municipalities’ Comprehensive Plan is unable to be realized without strict compliance.”
306. Justice Hunter continues “[T]he record seems clear to this court that on September 3, 2013, the Town made a determination at a public hearing that the Cayers had violated the Town's zoning ordinance and assessed a civil penalty.” Plaintiffs oppose and reject J. Hunter's claim that there was a “Hearing.”
307. Justice Hunter ignored Plaintiffs' claims that (1) CEO Ouellet issued Plaintiffs three permits that were vested. (2) The Stop Work Order was beyond the 30-day appeal period. (3) There was no violation. (4) There was no public “Hearing” by the Town. (5) Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer were not notified of any Hearing. (6) On September 2, 2013 Plaintiffs sent the Board a letter asking for more time to prepare for the Board meeting, inter alia, bias by Brenda Theriault and Barbera Skinnier. (7) Plaintiffs were not present at the Towns' September 3, 2013, meeting. (8) The Town, through its' Selectboard committed an Ultra Vires act because it does not have jurisdiction to determine a code violation, that is the responsibility of the CEO.
308. In his decision, Justice Hunter refers to the Law Court decision of, Town of Madawaska vs Richard Cayer, et al., 2014 ME 121, 103 A.3d 547 where the Law Court stated that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply......except possibly in extraordinary circumstances. The extraordinary circumstance in this case was simple, the permits were vested; therefore, the Stop Work order was illegal and a violation of Plaintiffs' Due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983; with Attorney's fees pursuant to U.S.C.§1988. Moreover, the code violation action began 43 hours (emphasis intended) after Plaintiffs filed a Petition to secede from the Town of Madawaska. The Dismissal with Prejudice provides dispositive proof that the two code violations were willfully fraudulent and meritless.
309. It took Justice Hunter Nine (9) months to adjudicate this RV anti-SLAPP case, partly because of the supplemental briefs. Maine and California's anti-SLAPP statutes of both states have similar language except for the Governmental actions. “[T]he special motion may be advanced on the docket and receive priority over other cases when the court determines that the interests of justice so require. Adjudication of the anti-SLAPP case in California must begin within 30 days. In the State of Maine, the average time for an anti-SLAPP to be adjudicated in Superior court is about 10 months, and 20 Months if it is appealed to the Law Court. It is important to remember the anti-SLAPP statute is intended to dismiss meritless lawsuits quickly and efficiently, thus allowing courts to address the backlog of meritorious lawsuits.
310. Because the Maine Judicial Court often cite California's Supreme Court's Special Motion to Dismiss decisions, it is important to note that California's anti SLAPP law is pursuant to its Rules of Civil procedure. The Maine anti-SLAPP Law is pursuant to Maine Statute.
311. Moreover, the Special Motion to Dismiss is unambiguous, and the statute is clear, “[A]ll discovery proceedings are stayed upon the filing of the Special Motion under this section, except that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery remains in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the special motion. [1995, c. 413, §1 (NEW).](3).” Justice Hunter allowed supplemental briefs which prejudiced Plaintiffs, and delayed the proceedings.
312. Plaintiffs were denied their Constitutional rights pursuant to Title 14 §556, and were not allowed to oppose a motion for discovery proceedings as provided by State Law.
313. Because of these delays and decision, Plaintiffs endured greater financial loss, unnecessarily prolonged the loss of enjoyment of property, and years more of pain, suffering and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs reputations.
314. Ten (10) months after the Town, it's CEO, and Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) successfully defended claims for the RV Count I and Count II in both, the Maine Superior Court, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court against Plaintiffs, the Town of Madawaska changed its position180 degrees from what Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) told the Maine Supreme Judicial Court under oath when the RV matter came for trial during the September 15, 2015 trial term.
315. When the RV matter came on for jury trial a second time during the September 2016 trial term, the Town, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41, sought to dismiss the two code violations unilaterally with prejudice once again, but could not do so because Plaintiffs had filed a written response and denial to the Land Use Citation and Complaint and Plaintiffs wanted the facts of what the Town, the town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had done to them to come out in public.
316. After Plaintiffs confirmed and made clear to the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) that Plaintiffs did not consent to the Town’s Dismissal with Prejudice, Justice Stewart personally informed the Plaintiffs in a second round of discussions that a dismissal with prejudice was an unusually good offer, and that the Plaintiffs should reconsider the offer. Fearing repercussions from the court, Plaintiffs reluctantly accepted the Town’s dismissal of the action with prejudice, with the understanding that Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer intended to file a tort lawsuit against the Town and its employees. The Dismissal with Prejudice was noted on the Docket Record on September 7, 2016.
317. It is important to note that at this court proceeding before Justice Stewart, the Town Dismissed with Prejudice two code violation lawsuits that the Town, the Town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had successfully defended in two (2) Special Motion to Dismiss (anti-SLAPP) lawsuits in two (2) previous Superior Courts, decided by Justice Cuddy and Justice Hunter.
318. It is also important to note that at this court proceeding before Justice Stewart, the Town also Dismissed with Prejudice one code violation lawsuit that the Town, the Town Manager Christina Therrein, CEO Ouellet, Attorneys Richard Currier Esq.(#2245) and Jon Plourde Esq. (#4772) had successfully defended in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court against Plaintiffs Special Motion to Dismiss by claiming, “[M]unicipalities suffer actual injury when their ordinances are not followed by their citizenry, because that municipalities’ Comprehensive Plan is unable to be realized without strict compliance.”
319. §16 (I) Enforcement is a Madawaska SZO mandatory procedural, due process of law requirement which must be followed in order to provide all citizens their Constitutionally protected rights. This was not done in Plaintiffs case.
320. Because of this Maine Supreme Judicial Court decision against Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer's Special Motion to Dismiss, the Cayers will forever be unjustly embarrassed because the Law Court has established, and has already applied in a Law Court decision, that the Cayer anti-SLAPP case was “[N]ot such a case.”
321. The Town’s dismissal of the action with prejudice was not made pursuant to any settlement agreement between the parties, and Plaintiffs did not pay or receive any consideration of any kind in connection with the dismissal of the action with prejudice.
322. Following the Dismissal with Prejudice, the Town Manager Ryan Pelletier told the Saint John Valley Times (SJV Times), “[T]he court dismissed the code violation case with prejudice in September, at the request of the Town. The “with prejudice” condition means that the town may bring no further legal action against Plaintiffs, the Cayers, for the original alleged code violations. It was a good faith effort to put the past behind and move forward for the betterment of the community.” The SJV Times article goes on, “[S]ince then, town and new code enforcement officer, Andrew Dube, have declined to reinstate the original building permit. The Town has declined to approve the building project the Cayers want to complete, according to Dube. He added that he would be uncomfortable reissuing a permit that old and one that another CEO previously approved.”
323. Plaintiffs assert CEO Dube and the Town have entered into another intentional tort of discrimination by denying Plaintiffs their vested permits inconsistent with the many illegal permits granted by CEO Dube without Planning Board determination of the greatest practical extent from the HWM listed below. This determination of the GPE from the HWM is a Title 38 Article 2-B:et. al. MANDATORY SHORELAND ZONING statute.
324. On Tuesday June 26, 2018, the Planning Board held an EMERGENCY MADAWASKA PLANNING Board PUBLIC MEETING. This emergency meeting was to determine the “[G]reatest practical extent and Planning Board (after the fact) permit for principle structure replacement foundation located at 183 Lake Shore Road (Map-35/ Lot-20). This determination by the Planning Board is pursuant to the Madawaska SZO §12C (2) Relocation. The determination by the Planning Board requires a complicated process outlined in the SZO §12C (2) Relocation. The Board never even discussed a determination of the greatest practical extent (GPE) from the high-water mark, (HWM), according to the minutes which read in part, “[D]uring construction the building was raised, and the foundation failed. CEO found no ill intentions. Property owners are from out of state and were not familiar with regulations. CEO states that everything is to code, and this is not considered an expansion.” CEO referenced the Shoreland Zoning book Article §12, C (1). (Plaintiffs assert §12 C (1). is for expansions.) §12C (2) Relocation is for determination of the GPE from the HWM. CEO Dube then stated, “There was no need to fine the property owners at this time. Note, this camp is 35 feet from the HWM and there are NEW expansions toward the HWM by approximately five (5) feet without permits on this property and CEO Dube lied about those expansions inter alia.
325. The CEO ignored all these serious Title 38 SZO violations and allowed further expansions toward the lake HWM, a serious DEP violation, with a foundation without Planning Board determination of the GPE from the HWM or a variance from the BOA.
326. On Monday May 21, 2018 CEO Dube and the PB held another “Emergency” meeting, willfully granting another “after the fact” permit for an accessory structure in violation of §12 C (3) fraudulently determined to be located 50 feet from the HWM. This new CEO Dube and PB willfully violate Title 38 SZO State statutes indiscriminately. Plaintiffs can will provide countless examples of these willful violations of State Law by CEO Dube and town PB.
327. Another Madawaska Planning Board determination of the GPE from the HWM for another permit application is recorded in the minutes of February 15, 2017 Planning Board meeting show the determination of the GPE from the HWM to be 80 feet because the owner wanted to build a garage in line with the driveway. This is another SZO violation because the Planning Board clearly understood when they applied the determination for Plaintiffs, first relocate then expand. See Maine Supreme Judicial Court Osprey Family Trust v. Town of Owlshead et al. Docket Kno-15-288, - June 7, 2016. Justice Mead writes, “[T]he Planning Board was required to consider how the original structure's footprint could be relocated before considering the proposed addition.” DEP Stephenie Maclagan also made the Planning Board understand exactly how to apply the determination of the GPE from the HWM when Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer met for that determination by the Planning Board. This Planning Board discussion is well documented.
328. On August 17, 2016, the Planning Board heard four (4) requests requiring the PB to decide the GPE from the HWM. In a few minutes the Planning Board granted (3) permits with little to no discussion regarding the GPE from the HWM, without applying any mandatory requirements pursuant to §12 C(2) or without applying Maclagan's requirements for those decisions as was understood when Plaintiffs applied for the same decision.
329. Because the Town was allowed to Dismiss with Prejudice without any settlement agreements, the Town's new CEO Andrew Dube now asserts Plaintiffs permits have expired and Plaintiff must begin the permitting process over again, inter alia, including the Planning Board determination for the greatest practical extent from the high water mark.
330. Following the Dismissal with Prejudice, Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer met with CEO Dube on September 9, 2016 to request continuation of the building with new permits because the old permits had expired. CEO Dube made statements such as “[t]he permits were old permits issued by the previous CEO Ouellet and he did not know if the permits were legal.” CEO Dube told Plaintiffs he needed something from the court.
331. In the short time CEO Dube has been the CEO, he has issued 5 permits that Plaintiffs know of that are in violation of DEP Title 38 Article 2-B:et. al. MANDATORY SHORELAND ZONING statute, inter alia, the determination of the GPE from the HWM by the Planning Board. Three of these were for foundations and one was also for violating §12(C)(3) of the SZO with removal of 100% of the structure without the required review of the Planning Board or a BOA variance.
332. Two of these violations were determined to require “Emergency Planning Board meetings” with very little documented information except that there was no fine, and permits were issued.
333. Plaintiffs assert these willful illegal actions by the CEO, Planning Board, and the Town, are intentional violations of Maine statutes Title 38. Waters and Navigation. It is important to note the differential treatment by the CEO where serious SZO Title 30 violations without permits are allowed “Emergency” Planning Board meetings granting permits without discussing the GPE, and without fines. This same differential treatment was perpetrated upon Plaintiffs Richard and Ann at the 2006 BOA meeting where Plaintiffs permits were willfully and illegally revoked with a very lengthy meeting followed by 8 variances granted without ever discussing “Undue Hardship”, or Findings of Facts and Conclusions in less time than it took to revoke the 2 PB permits. Ultimately the BOA's actions against Plaintiffs were overturned by the Superior Court.
334. After the September 7, 2016 Dismissal with Prejudice by Justice Stewart, Plaintiffs met with CEO Dube September 9, 2016 requesting a permit renewal. Plaintiffs waited until September 22, 2016 to provide the CEO enough time to answer his questions with the court decision. Because CEO Dube willfully took no action on Plaintiffs request, Plaintiffs Attorney wrote to CEO Dube on October 13, 2016 confirming the Dismissal with Prejudice but received no response from the CEO. (The Town SZO §16 D Procedure for Administrating Permits states, “[W]ithin 35 days of the date of receiving a written application....SHALL notify the applicant in writing..”)
335. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Declaratory Judgment on January 18, 2017.
336. On March 14, 2018 seven (7) months after Plaintiffs request to renew their permits, Town Attorney Edmond J. Bearor wrote to Plaintiffs Attorney Luke Rossingnol stating, “[I] asked the town to think of options that might be open to Mr. Cayer for the construction of a building on his lot. Please consider this communication to be subject to Rule 408. See the attached outline for your consideration.” This willful inflammatory communication from the Town CEO Drew Dube was headed, “Richard Cayer Resolution Options.” Plaintiffs believe the outrageous “Resolution Options” by the CEO was willfully intended to inflame Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs successfully defended themselves against the Town's meritless code violations lawsuits and threatened to sue the Town and its employees for initiating and continuing the malicious prosecution against Plaintiffs Richard and Ann Cayer. Plaintiff's also believe that the most logical reason, based on the Town's past practice, for the Town to withhold Plaintiff's permit after the dismissal with prejudice was to offer the permits as a bargaining chip for Plaintiffs to dismiss the tort claims against the Town and its employees.
337. Furthermore, for Attorney Ed Bearor to claim in his March 14, 2018 email that the “Resolution Options” was “subject to Rule 408 is regarded by Plaintiffs as, extrinsic fraud.
338. M.R.E. 408. is clear and unambiguous. The email from Attorney Ed Bearor was clearly not a, “[F]urnishing, promising, or offering, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim.” Plaintiffs assert the information by Ed Bearor was intended to inflame Plaintiffs to which Plaintiffs refused to respond.
339. The CEO's actions are in willful direct contrast to the fraudulent claims by the Town Manager Ryan Pelletier when he told the Saint John Valley Times, “[T]he court dismissed the code violation case with prejudice in September, at the request of the Town. The “with prejudice” condition means that the town may bring no further legal action against Plaintiffs, the Cayers, for the original alleged code violations. It was a good faith effort to put the past behind and move forward for the betterment of the community.”
340. Town Manager Ryan Pelletier insinuates that the Town was doing Plaintiffs a favor by dismissing the meritless lawsuits the Town brought against Plaintiffs. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is well documented that Plaintiffs were vehemently opposed to the Dismissal with Prejudice until Justice Stewart convinced Plaintiffs it was a good offer. Furthermore, for the town Manager to claim “[I]t was a good faith effort to put the past behind and move forward for the betterment of the community” is an equally willful fraudulent statement considering the actions the town took when Plaintiffs requested that their permits be renewed in order to move forward, as claimed by the town, with their building project.
341. The Summary Judgment was denied to both parties by Justice Stewart leaving the Declaratory Judgment to be decided. The issue before Justice Stewart was simple. The Stop Work Order caused Plaintiffs to stop working on the camp. The Stop work Order was illegal and violated Plaintiffs Due Process rights for a Hearing before a court of law because the permits were vested. Furthermore, because the case was dismissed with prejudice the claims by the town were meritless and the Stop Work Order illegal. Moreover, the Town SZO does not have provisions for a SWO, but it does have language in 16 I §(3) for an injunction, and a Due Process of Law Hearing, whenever permits are vested.
342. Plaintiffs provided Defendants notice of their tort claims against Defendants by a Notice of Claim served on Defendants on or about November 13, 2016 in compliance with the provisions of 14 M.R.S. § 8107 of the Maine Tort Claims Act.
343. The Town of Madawaska and its Attorneys gave no rational excuse or reason why the Board of Selectpersons have intentionally elected to enforce meritless lawsuits against Plaintiffs without the town's legislative authority granting the appropriation of funds necessary for the enforcement of such actions.
344. This Ultra Virous act by the Selectpersons violated their oath of office to limit expenditures of funds to the amounts appropriated by the legislative body in a Town meeting.