Filed in Superior Court on 9.04.18

Amended Complaint RE 2010 and 2014 Actions

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

AROOSTOOK, ss. CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. CARSC-CV-2018-___

RICHARD CAYER and ANN CAYER,

residents of the Town of Madawaska,

Aroostook County, Maine,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs

TOWN OF MADAWASKA, a Municipal

corporation located in Aroostook County,

Maine,

ROBERT OUELLET, a resident of

Wallagrass, Aroostook County, Maine,

CHRISTINA THERRIEN, a resident of

Machias, Washington County, Maine,

VINCE FRALLICCIARDI, a resident of

Madawaska, Aroostook County, Maine,

JEFF ALBERT, a resident of Madawaska,

Aroostook County, Maine,

and

DON CHASSE, a resident of Madawaska,

Aroostook County, Maine,

Defendants

PLAINTIFFS, Richard Cayer and Ann Cayer, through counsel, allege and complain against Defendants as follows:

PARTIES

1. Plaintiffs, Richard Cayer and Ann Cayer, are residents of the Town of Madawaska, Aroostook County, Maine.

2. Defendant, Town of Madawaska, is a municipal corporation located in Aroostook County, Maine.

3. Defendant, Robert Ouellet, is a resident of Wallagrass, Aroostook County, Maine, and was the former Code Enforcement Officer for the Town of Madawaska at all times relevant to this Complaint.

4. Defendant, Christina Therrien, is a resident of Machias, Washington County, Maine, and was the former Town Manager for the Town of Madawaska at all times relevant to this Complaint.

5. Defendant, Vince Fralliciardi, is a resident of Madawaska, Aroostook County, Maine, and is a former member of the Board of Selectmen for the Town of Madawaska at all times relevant to this Complaint, during which time he was involved in making the decisions to take wrongful actions against Plaintiffs as described in this Complaint.

6. Defendant, Jeff Albert, is a resident of Madawaska, Aroostook County, Maine, and is a former member of the Planning Board for the Town of Madawaska at all times relevant to this Complaint, during which time he was involved in making the decisions to take wrongful actions against Plaintiffs as described in this Complaint.

7. Defendant, Don Chasse, is a resident of Madawaska, Aroostook County, Maine, and is a former member of the Board of Selectmen for the Town of Madawaska at all times relevant to this Complaint, during which time he was involved in making the decisions to take wrongful actions against Plaintiffs as described in this Complaint.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

The 2010 Rule 80K Enforcement Action

8. Plaintiffs own a certain piece of property located at 57 Chapel Road, Lot 468, in the shoreland zone in the Town of Madawaska, which property is improved by a seasonal camp with an access driveway, running water, and subsurface waste water disposal system (hereafter the “Property”).

9. In the summer of 2010, Plaintiffs rented the Property to a couple for use as a camp during the summer season.

10. Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, the tenants placed two small recreational vehicles/travel-trailers on the Property when the tenants occupied the Property.

11. On June 4, 2010, Defendant, Robert Ouellet, the Town of Madawaska Code Enforcement Officer gave Plaintiffs notice of an alleged violation at the property as a result of the placement of the two RV/travel trailers on the Property.

12. At the time Plaintiffs received the June 4, 2010 Notice of Violation, they understood that there was only one RV/travel-travel trailer placed on the Property, and that it was legal to have one RV/travel-trailer on the Property.

13. Notwithstanding their understanding regarding the legality of placing an RV/travel-trailer on the property, Plaintiffs had the tenants remove one of the RV/travel-trailers from the Property on June 4, 2010.

14. The Town of Madawaska subsequently conducted a public meeting regarding the alleged violation before the Town of Madawaska's Board of Selectmen on June 29, 2010.

15. At the June 29, 2010 Board of Selectmen meeting, it was confirmed that there was still one RV/travel-travel trailer on the Property.

16. Acting without any legal authority to do so, the Board found a violation existed on the Property; and directed Plaintiffs to remove the remaining travel trailer from the lot, pay a civil penalty of $500.00, and enter into a Consent Agreement admitting to the violation.

17. Plaintiffs refused to admit the violation, pay a civil penalty, or enter into a Consent Agreement, but had the remaining travel trailer removed from the Property on or before July 6, 2010, even though Plaintiffs understood and believed that it was legal for them to have one RV/travel-trailer on the Property under the existing Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.

18. Plaintiffs lost the income that they would have earned from the one RV/travel-trailer that could have and should have remained on the Property.

19. On or about August 11, 2010, the Town of Madawaska, by and through its Code Enforcement Officer and attorney, filed a Land Use Citation and Complaint alleging that Plaintiffs violated Section 15(A)(5) of the Town of Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance by having more than one residential dwelling unit on the Property without meeting the dimensional requirements for each additional dwelling units; and by placing the RV/travel-trailers on the Property without a land-use permit.

20. The Town did not provide any reference or citation to any provisions of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance or other law in support of its allegation in the Land Use Citation and Complaint that a land-use permit was required to place an RV/travel-trailer on the Property.

21. Plaintiffs filed a timely request to remove the matter to the Superior Court for a jury trial as allowed under M.R.Civ.P. 38 and City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶¶ 10-15, 886 A.2d 1281, 1285-869.

22. On August 9, 2012, the Superior Court (Daigle, J.) conducted a judicial settlement conference on the matter, at which the Town of Madawaska acknowledged that the Notice of Violation and the Land Use Citation and Complaint erroneously cited Plaintiffs for violations under a section of the Town of Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance that did not apply due to the fact that the Ordinance plainly defined travel trailers as "recreational vehicles" and not "residential dwelling units."

23. After acknowledging their clear error, the Town of Madawaska filed a Motion to Amend its Land Use Citation and Complaint on November 13, 2012, and alleged a new violation based on the provisions of Section 15(D)(1) related to campgrounds.

24. The Town of Madawaska did not provide Plaintiffs a new written notice of the alleged new violation in accordance with the applicable provisions of Section 16(H)(2) and (3) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance relating to enforcement actions in effect at that time. (The Shoreland Zoning Ordinance was subsequently amended such that the enforcement provisions of the Ordinance were moved to Section 16(I) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.)

25. Plaintiffs responded to the Town of Madawaska's Motion to Amend Complaint on December 5, 2012, and noted in their response that they did not object to the proposed amendment stated in the Town of Madawaska's Motion to Amend Complaint, but that they reserved all rights to answer, deny, and oppose the amended Complaint and all allegations stated therein.

26. Plaintiffs again requested that the matter be tried before a jury pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 38 and City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶¶ 10-15, 886 A.2d 1281, 1285-869, and paid the jury fee.

27. The Court granted the Town of Madawaska's Motion to Amend Complaint on January 24, 2013.

28. On or about March 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Dismiss the Amended Land Use Citation and Complaint pursuant to 14 M.R.S § 556.

29. The Town of Madawaska opposed the Special Motion to Dismiss.

30. The Superior Court (Cuddy, J.) denied Plaintiffs’ Special Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs appealed the denial to the Law Court.

31. The Town opposed Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Law Court.

32. The Law Court denied Plaintiffs’ appeal, and the 2010 enforcement matter proceeded on the Superior Court’s civil jury trial list.

The 2014 Rule 80K Enforcement Action

33. On May 21, 2008, Plaintiffs applied for a land use building permit requesting to remove a portion of an existing camp (camper trailer) on their property located at 57 Chapel Road, Lot 468, in the shoreland zone in the Town of Madawaska, and expand according to the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, specifically Section 12(C)(1) related to expansions.

34. Between May 21, 2008, and August 25, 2008, Plaintiffs’ application was handled and reviewed by various officials and representatives of the Town of Madawaska, including the secretary for the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer, the Town’s Licensed Plumbing Inspector, and the Town’s Planning Board.

35. As part of the Town’s preliminary review of Plaintiffs’ application, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (Robert Ouellet) conducted a site visit at the subject property on or about July 14, 2008, and informed Plaintiffs that their application would have to be reviewed by the Planning Board to determine the “greatest practical extent” based on Section 12(C)(2) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance related to relocation, regardless of whether any portion of the old camp was used or not.

36. In a July 21, 2008 letter, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer informed Plaintiffs based on “my site visit on Monday, July 14, 2008” and “based on Section 12(C)(3)”, that Plaintiffs’ “application is for the removal of the trailer portion; therefore it is my decision that your application must be reviewed by the Planning board to determine the setback requirement to the greatest practical extent from the normal high water line.”

37. Based on this information, Plaintiffs amended their application to include the removal of all the camp on July 28, 2008.

38. In a July 29, 2008 letter, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer informed Plaintiffs that: "I am in receipt of an amended land-use application that was received on 7/28/2008" and "this amended application is for the removal of all buildings and to include the construction of a foundation/slab under a 42' by 24' by 20' h new structure. The application illustrated that the new larger structure with a foundation would be at the same setback from the high water line and side property line, as the previous structure. For both of these reasons (basement and location), the Planning Board would have to review the application to determine the greatest practical extent from the normal high water line."

39. Based on the Code Enforcement Officer’s information, Plaintiffs amended their application on July 28, 2008, to remove all of the camp, and requested to meet with the Planning Board to determine the greatest practical extent from the high-water line, as suggested by the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer.

40. On August 25, 2008, the Town’s Planning Board conducted a review of Plaintiff’s application, during which Plaintiff Richard Cayer made clear that the proposed project involved the removal of the old existing camp and the expansion of the extension, all as set forth in the application and amended application.

41. After considering all of the information related to Plaintiffs’ application, as amended, the Planning Board voted to accept Plaintiffs’ land use application, as amended, for a replacement location for a seasonal dwelling at the greatest practical extent from the normal high water line.

42. After the project was delayed as a result of health problems experienced by Plaintiff Richard Cayer, Plaintiffs applied for a new permit on April 10, 2012, for a replacement structure on the condition that the application could be processed without the need for review by the Planning Board based on the fact that the Planning Board had already made the determination of the greatest practical extent on August 25, 2008, and based on page 35 of the Maine Municipal Association’s Planning Board Handbook.

43. On May 22, 2012, Plaintiffs filed another permit application for extension to the existing camp to increase floor space and add a second floor, and included drawings of the proposed project.

44. On May 29, 2012, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer issued a permit which included the Project Description as follows: “Extension of Existing Camper and Addition by Constructing Steel Framework for second floor 16'x20'. Construct 2nd Floor with loft and Cathedral Ceiling. Height of Bldg shall be no higher than 20' within 75 ' of NHWL from existing ground level in Front. - Dye testing of Septic System is required. New Construction shall be no closer than 5 ft. from property line.”

45. On June 14, 2012, the Code Enforcement Officer sent Plaintiffs a letter explaining that he had conducted a test on Plaintiffs’ septic system and wrote: “On this date it appears that the system is functioning properly.”

46. On June 18, 2012, Plaintiffs applied for a permit and the Code Enforcement Officer granted it on June 18, 2012, noting and confirming the Project Description as follows: “45'x12' Extension to Existing Structure. A 20” section of the recently purchased mobile home (65'X12') will be removed and the remaining portion 45'X12' will be attached to the existing structure as shown on the diagram.” The referenced diagram clearly shows the existing structure to be the new steel expansion.

47. On July 5, 2012, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer posted a memo to his file, stating that he received a call from Roger Collin regarding Plaintiffs’ permits.

48. On July 5, 2012, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer went to Plaintiffs’ property (camp 468, lot 20) with the Police, and informed Plaintiffs that he received a call that Plaintiffs were doing something in violation of their building permits.

49. The Code Enforcement Officer took pictures of Plaintiffs’ site on July 5, 2012, and was satisfied that Plaintiffs were not in violation.

50. On August 20, 2012, Plaintiffs received a notice of hearing on an Administrative Appeal by David Rouleau challenging the application and permits approved by the Town regarding Plaintiffs’ camp 468, lot 20.

51. On August 27, 2012, the Town of Madawaska Board of Appeals held a meeting concerning the Administrative Appeal filed by David Rouleau.

52. At the August 27, 2012 Administrative Appeal, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer defended all of the permits issued to Plaintiffs against David Rouleau's allegations; supported all of Plaintiffs’ permits as being legal; and highlighted the following facts:

(a) Plaintiffs “removed less than 50% of the market value” of the property;

(b) Plaintiffs submitted an initial application for replacement unit that was brought to the Planning Board, and Plaintiffs decided they did not want to go with that application;

Plaintiffs were not playing games with the Board by amending their initial application, but had properly exercised their choice to pursue their project in a different avenue;

the measurements on the application were correct, and the Code Enforcement Officer was taking full responsibility for the measurements; and

(e) the applicable provisions of the first paragraph of Section 12(C)(3) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, as he had done in his July 21, 2008 letter to Plaintiffs.

53. On September 17, 2012, Plaintiffs had a new septic site plan designed by a soil site evaluator, and provided a copy of the plan to the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer and a representative of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection by email.

54. On September 18, 2012, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer went to Plaintiffs’ camp 468, lot 20, to take pictures after Plaintiffs’ construction was done for the season, which pictures show and confirm the new steel camp expansion and what was left of the old camp.

55. As of the time when the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer took pictures at Plaintiffs’ property on September 18, 2012, there was no market value left of the old trailer portion of the camp, and the status of the project was no different than what existed on August 27, 2012, when the Town’s Board of Appeals conducted its Administrative Appeal at which the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer stated that Plaintiffs “removed less than 50% of the market value.”

56. No more work was done to the camp expansion from after October 17, 2012.

57. On March 15, 2013, Plaintiffs applied for a permit for an expansion to the structure permitted on June 18, 2012, “to expand existing camp to maximum allowed expansion” as shown in a drawing included with the application.

58. On April 8, 2013, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer wrote to Plaintiffs and confirmed that (a) he was in receipt of a land use application, dated March 15, 2013; (b) the application requested an expansion to the structure that was permitted on June 18, 2012; and that (c) he was granting Plaintiffs’ a permit for the requested expansion per the plan to maximize allowable expansion.

59. The Code Enforcement Officer’s April 8, 2013 permit approval contained no reference to the old camp/trailer, and did not identify any violations by Plaintiffs at the property.

60. On May 19, 2013, Plaintiffs started to remove any part of the old camp that could not be used to comply with Section 12(B)(2) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, as required under the standard conditions of Plaintiffs’ permits.

61. On June 4, 2013, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer sent Plaintiffs a Notice of Violation based on Section 12(C)(3) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, and which indicated that “this Stop Work Order is in force until the Board of Select People meet to discuss this matter.”

62. The Code Enforcement Officer’s Notice of Violation ignored the fact that the Planning Board had already determined the greatest practical extent in a hearing, based on Section 12(C)(2) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, which is necessary to satisfy the 50% provisions in Sections 12(C)(3) and 12(C)(1) of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance in order to issue a permit in the first place.

63. The Town’s Code Enforcement Officer did not have the authority to include a Stop Work Order in the June 4, 2013 Notice of Violation, and violated Plaintiffs’ Due Process rights by doing so.

64. The June 4, 2013 Stop Work Order was served less than one week after Plaintiffs had presented the Town with the petition to secede from the Town on May 28, 2013.

65. Plaintiffs opposed the Notice of Violation and Stop Work Order as a violation of their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the United States and Maine constitutions based on the facts that their three permits were legal and were vested.

66. On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff Richard Cayer met with the Board of Selectmen to discuss his request for a hearing before the Planning Board to determine the removal of more than 50%, as provided in Section 12(C)(3) Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, and the Board agreed. The Madawaska Shoreland Zoning Ordinance states that "if it is determined by the Code Enforcement Officer and Planning Board members that it is more than 50% based on current market value and the applicant disputes it, then he/she needs to submit an insurance or professional appraisal."

67. On July 9, 2013, Plaintiff Richard Cayer met with the Planning Board to determine if more than 50% had been removed according to the applicable provisions of the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.

68. During the July 9, 2013 Planning Board meeting, Planning Board Member Vince Varnier asked the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer if the building was now worth $4,000.00, due to the fact that the camp had been previously appraised by the Town to have a value of $2,000.00, and the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer agreed that the camp was currently worth $4,000.00. Notwithstanding this confirmation, the Planning Board still required the Plaintiffs to get an appraisal.

69. Plaintiffs subsequently obtained an appraisal by a licensed appraiser, and the value of the camp was deemed to be worth $27,500.00.

70. On August 12, 2013, Plaintiffs met with the Planning Board to discuss the appraisal which valued the camp at $27,500.00.

71. During the August 12, 2013 Planning Board meeting, the Planning Board refused to consider or discuss the appraisal by the licensed appraiser at a second board hearing. When Plaintiffs asked the Planning Board what they should do with the appraisal, the response from Planning Board member Jeff Albert, who had been very vocal and who had taken over the hearings, said: “You will need it for court.”

72. The Town has since re-evaluated the camp for tax purposes, and the Town Assessor currently values the camp at $6,000.00, three (3) times more than before the alleged 50% value had been removed according to the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer and the Planning Board.

73. According to Town Assessor, the prior $2,000.00 valuation of the original camp was based on the fact that it was grandfathered and that there was no value left in the existing camp, and the Tax Assessor’s recommendation was to remove the camp because it had no value. The Town’s Code Enforcement Officer made several statements in public meetings/hearings supporting the claims of the Tax Assessor.

74. On August 22, 2013, the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer notified Plaintiffs that “The Stop Work Order remains in effect until there is a resolution in this matter.”

75. On September 2, 2013, Plaintiff Richard Cayer sent a letter to the Town’s Town Manager and the Select Board asking for postponement of the Select Board meeting scheduled for September 3, 2013, pertaining to the alleged code violations, which letter included the reasons for postponement.

76. On September 3, 2013, the Madawaska Select Board ignored Plaintiff’s letter to postpone; ignored Plaintiffs’ appraisal showing that more than 50% of the value of the camp had not been removed; held a meeting; discussed the alleged violations; and voted to bring an enforcement action against Plaintiffs, all without allowing Plaintiffs to be present, and all in contravention to the Town’s well-documented history of allowing Town citizens who have been notified of an alleged land use violation to reschedule their matter before the Select Board.

77. On September 18, 2013, Plaintiffs received a letter from the Town Manager, which notified Plaintiffs of the Select Board’s determination of the alleged violations, and offered Plaintiffs a Consent Agreement to resolve the alleged violations.

78. Plaintiffs refused to enter into any Consent Agreement in which they acknowledged any violations at their property.

79. On April 22, 2014, Plaintiffs were served a Land Use Citation and Complaint by a Sheriff’s Deputy for alleged violations of the Town’s Shoreland Zoning Ordinance.

80. Plaintiffs removed the matter concerning the Town’s 2014 Land Use Citation and Complaint to the Maine Superior Court for a trial by jury.

81. On or about June 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Special Motion to Dismiss the 2014 building Land Use Citation and Complaint pursuant to Maine Anit-SLAPP statute (14 M.R.S. §556), which Motion the Town of Madawaska and the Superior Court (Hunter, J.) denied.

82. When the 2010 Rule 80K enforcement action came on for trial during the September, 2016 trial term, the Town sought to dismiss both the 2010 and 2014 enforcement actions unilaterally, but could not do so pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 41 because Plaintiffs had filed a written responses and denials to the Land Use Citation and Complaints.

83. After Plaintiffs confirmed and made clear to the Superior Court (Stewart, J.) that Plaintiffs did not consent to the Town’s unilateral dismissal of the actions, Plaintiffs accepted the Town’s dismissal of the actions, with prejudice, and the dismissals with prejudice were noted on the Docket Record on September 7, 2016.

84. The Town’s dismissals of the actions with prejudice were not made pursuant to any settlement agreement between the parties, and Plaintiffs did not pay or receive any consideration of any kind in connection with the dismissals of the actions with prejudice.

85. Plaintiffs provided Defendants notice of their tort claims against Defendants by a Notice of Claim served on Defendants on or about November 13, 2016, in compliance with the provisions of 14 M.R.S. § 8107 of the Maine Tort Claims Act.

COUNT I

(Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings – 2010 Rule 80K Enforcement Action)

86. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations stated in paragraphs 1through 85 herein by reference.

87. Defendants initiated, procured and/or continued a civil proceeding (i.e., the 2010 Rule 80K enforcement action described above) against Plaintiffs without probable cause and without reasonable grounds for the action.

88. Defendants proceeded with the civil proceedings against Plaintiffs with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim or claims upon which the proceedings were based.

89. The 2010 proceeding brought against Plaintiffs by Defendants terminated in Plaintiffs favor by virtue of Defendants’ withdrawal and/or dismissal with prejudice of the actions on September 7, 2016.

90. Plaintiffs suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful use of civil proceedings against Plaintiffs, including but not limited to financial losses, deprivation of constitutional and other property rights emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in their favor on their claims for Defendants’ wrongful use of civil proceedings; award Plaintiffs damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for their losses and damages; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs; and grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II

(Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings – 2014 Rule 80K Enforcement Action)

91. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 90 herein by reference.

92. Defendants initiated, procured and/or continued a civil proceeding (i.e., the 2014 Rule 80K enforcement action described above) against Plaintiffs without probable cause and without reasonable grounds for the action.

93. Defendants proceeded with the civil proceedings against Plaintiffs with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim or claims upon which the proceedings were based.

94. The 2014 proceeding brought against Plaintiffs by Defendants terminated in Plaintiffs favor by virtue of Defendants’ withdrawal and/or dismissal with prejudice of the actions on September 7, 2016.

95. Plaintiffs suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful use of civil proceedings against Plaintiffs, including but not limited to financial losses, deprivation of constitutional and other property rights emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

COUNT III

(Abuse of Process – 2010 Rule 80K Enforcement Action)

96. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 95 herein by reference.

97. Defendants initiated and/or used court documents and/or court processes in prosecuting the 2010 Rule 80K enforcement action against Plaintiffs in a manner that was not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings with a motive to injure and/or delay Plaintiffs.

98. Plaintiffs suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful abuse of process against Plaintiffs, including but not limited to financial losses, deprivation of constitutional and other property rights emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter judgment in their favor on their claims for Defendants’ wrongful abuse of process; award Plaintiffs damages sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for their losses and damages; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs; and grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT IV

(Abuse of Process – 2014 Rule 80K Enforcement Action)

99. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 98 herein by reference.

100. Defendants initiated and/or used court documents and/or court processes in prosecuting the 2014 Rule 80K enforcement action against Plaintiffs in a manner that was not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings with a motive to injure and/or delay Plaintiffs.

101. Plaintiffs suffered substantial damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful abuse of process against Plaintiffs, including but not limited to financial losses, deprivation of constitutional and other property rights emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

COUNT V

(Violation of Federal Civil Rights—42 U.S.C. § 1983)

102. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 101 by reference.

103. Defendants’ actions, as alleged in this Complaint, constitute intentional actions taken under color of law which Defendants knew or should have known deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, privileges and immunities without due process of law.

104. Defendants actions were undertaken pursuant to the policies, customs, and/or practices of Town of Madawaska.

105. Defendants Robert Ouellett, Christina Therrien, Vince Frallicciardi, Jeff Albert, and Don Chasse are not immune from individual and/or personal liability because their intentional actions were not undertaken in good faith, and because they knew or should have known that their actions deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, privileges and immunities without due process of law.

106. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful and intentional actions, Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages, including but not limited to the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without due process of law, monetary damages, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims for Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights; award Plaintiffs damages sufficient to compensate them for Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, pain and suffering, and emotional distress; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs incurred in this matter; and grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT VI

(Violation of Maine Civil Rights Act—5 M.R.S.A. § 4681 et seq.)

107. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 106 by reference.

108. Defendants’ actions, as alleged in this Complaint, constitute intentional actions taken under color of law which Defendants knew or should have known interfered with Plaintiffs’ free exercise of their federal and state constitutional rights, privileges and immunities.

109. Defendants actions were undertaken for the purposes of intimidating, coercing and/or punishing Plaintiffs so that Plaintiffs would not exercise their rights to speak and/or report on Defendants’ wrongful and illegal activities.

110. Defendants Robert Ouellett, Christina Therrien, Vince Frallicciardi, Jeff Albert, and Don Chasse are not immune from individual and/or personal liability because their intentional actions were not undertaken in good faith, and because they knew or should have known that their actions deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, privileges and immunities without due process of law.

111. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful and intentional actions, Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, damages, including but not limited to the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights without due process of law, monetary damages, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and legal fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims for Defendants’ violations of the Maine Civil Rights Act; award Plaintiffs damages sufficient to compensate them for Defendants’ violations of the Maine Civil Rights Act, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, pain and suffering, and emotional distress; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs incurred in this matter; and grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, including injunctive relief.

COUNT VII
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)

112. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 111 by reference.

113. Defendants engaged in intentional or reckless conduct that inflicted upon Plaintiffs serious emotional distress or was substantially certain to result in serious emotional distress to Plaintiff.

114. Defendants’ conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable.

115. Plaintiffs have suffered serious emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ conduct, including but not limited to extreme stress, anxiety, and loss of sleep.

116. The serious emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs was created by the circumstances of the events caused by Defendants which no reasonable person could be expected to endure.

117. Defendants’ actions, as alleged in this Complaint, were done with malice such that Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages, including reasonable attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims for Defendants’ intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Plaintiffs; award Plaintiffs damages sufficient to compensate them for Defendants’ intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Plaintiffs, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, and pain and suffering; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs incurred in this matter; and grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT VIII

(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)

118. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 117 by reference.

119. Defendants acted negligently and engaged in other tortious conduct as set forth in this Complaint.

120. Emotional distress to Plaintiffs was a reasonably foreseeable result of Defendants’ negligent and tortious conduct.

121. Plaintiffs have suffered serious emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ negligent and tortious conduct, including but not limited to extreme stress, anxiety, and loss of sleep.

122. The serious emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs was created by the circumstances of the events caused by Defendants which no reasonable person, normally constituted, could be expected to adequately endure.

123. Defendants’ actions, as alleged in this Complaint, were done with malice such that Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages, including reasonable attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims for Defendants’ negligent infliction of emotional distress upon Plaintiffs; award Plaintiff damages sufficient to compensate them for Defendants’ negligent infliction of emotional distress upon Plaintiffs, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, and pain and suffering; award Plaintiffs their legal fees and costs incurred in this matter; and grant Plaintiffs such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: ____________________ ____________________________________

Luke M. Rossignol, Esq. (ME Bar #8913)

Bemis & Rossignol, LLC

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

454 Main Street – P.O. Box 782

Presque Isle, ME 04769

(207) 764-3124

Why Town Government Fails

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The Long View of Local and State Politics

Filed in Superior Court on 9.04.18

Amended Complaint RE 2010 and 2014 Actions